










The handle http://hdl.handle.net/1887/26923 holds various files of this Leiden University 
dissertation 
 
Author: Vries, Gerdien de 
Title: Pitfalls in the communication about CO2 capture and storage 





Pitfalls in the Communication 
about CO2 Capture and Storage 
 
 

















ISBN:   978-90-5335-868-9 
Cover Design:  Saskia de Been 




Pitfalls in the Communication 





ter verkrijging van 
de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden 
op gezag van Rector Magnificus prof. mr. C.J.J.M. Stolker, 
volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties 
te verdedigen op woensdag 18 juni 2014 




Gerdien de Vries 









Prof. dr. N. Ellemers 
    
Co-promotor:  
Dr. B.W. Terwel 
    
Overige leden: 
Prof. dr. E. van Dijk    
 
Dr. A.M. Lokhorst    Wageningen Universiteit 
 
Dr. H. Staats     
 








The research in this dissertation has been carried out within CATO-2, the 
Dutch national research program on CO2 capture and storage. This 
program is financially supported by the Dutch Ministry of Economic 













Pitfalls in the Communication about CCS 




































Survey Research p. 79 
Appendix B 
 
Stimulus Material Chapter 3 p. 84 
References 
 
 p. 87 
Samenvatting  Summary in Dutch p. 98 
   
Acknowledgments 
 
 p. 104 
Curriculum Vitae 
 
 p. 105 
KLI Dissertation Series 
 
p. 106 





This dissertation is aimed at the identification of pitfalls in the communication about 
CO2 capture and storage. It presents the results of experimental and survey research 
on three communication techniques: heaping information, emphasis framing, and 
greening. The dissertation is structured as follows:  
 
Chapter 1 is the “umbrella” chapter. It sets the context in which the research was 
conducted. Furthermore, Chapter 1 connects the different lines of research by 
discussing their relevance, coherence, and differences. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are 
adaptations of papers on the experimental research. These chapters are written in 
first-person plural because the papers were composed in collaboration with Bart 
Terwel, Naomi Ellemers, and Dancker Daamen. The original papers are published in or 
under review at peer-reviewed journals. Each experimental chapter discusses one of 
the three communication techniques and can be read independently of the other 
chapters. Due to this independency, however, there is some overlap between the 
chapters, especially in their opening paragraphs. The order of the chapters is 
motivated by theory, not by chronology of execution of the research. 
 
Throughout the dissertation, references are made to Appendix A. This appendix 
presents data of a large-scale survey held among a representative sample of the Dutch 





Pitfalls in the Communication about CCS
 
 
One of the greatest environmental challenges the world is facing today is combating 
global warming. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
warming of the climate system is unequivocal (IPCC, 2013). This change in climate has 
potentially harmful consequences for humankind and nature, including disturbance of 
ecosystems, extinction of some plant- and animal species, and a rising sea level.  
 
Global warming is largely due to growing concentrations of so-called greenhouse gases 
in the atmosphere. Primary greenhouse gases are water vapor (H2O), methane 
(CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and carbon dioxide (CO2). In essence, greenhouse gases are 
very useful. They provide a livable climate by trapping solar heat that is radiated back 
from the earth's surface. Without greenhouse gases, the earth would be too cold for 
plants and animals to survive. However, when the amount of greenhouse gases 
increases, more heat is trapped than necessary. This causes the globe to warm up. To 
combat global warming, many industrialized countries have agreed to reduce their 
emissions of greenhouse gases. This agreement has been formalized in the so-called 
Kyoto Protocol and the recently adopted Doha amendment (United Nations, 1998, 
2012).  
 
Greenhouse gases partially result from naturally-induced processes. For example, 
methane is released from wetlands and oceans, and CO2 is breathed out by animals 
and humans. However, greenhouse gases also result from human-induced 
(anthropogenic) activities. The best known anthropogenic activity is probably the 
combustion of fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and natural gas to produce energy and 
electricity. However, greenhouse gases are also released from the industrial 
production of iron, steel, and cement, and from agriculture. Anthropogenic 
greenhouse gases are now regarded as the most important contributors to global 
warming, especially CO2 from fossil fuel-related emissions (IPCC, 2013; WMO, 2013). 
Therefore, most measures to combat global warming are aimed at mitigating 
emissions of anthropogenic CO2.  
 
Emissions of CO2 can be reduced at many levels. At the individual level, people can 
reduce their energy consumption by turning off devices (such as the television) when 
not in use, installing insulation in their homes, and using public transport instead of 
cars. At the organizational level, manufacturers can develop energy efficient 
appliances, and industrial companies can make more efficient use of fossil fuels. At the 
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global level, countries could turn to a more balanced energy mix featuring renewable 
(non-fossil) sources such as water, biomass, wind, and sun.  
 
Well-designed policies that encourage individuals, organizations, and societies to be 
efficient in their energy consumption can help to achieve substantial energy savings 
(Geller et al., 2006). However, the uptake of energy efficiency is slow (IEA, 2012) and 
relatively few people and organizations engage in sustainable behavior for the purpose 
of combating global warming (Whitmarsh, 2009). Moreover, despite the potential of 
renewable energy sources, progress in the development and use of clean energy is 
falling behind (IEA, 2012). Therefore, governments all over the world are currently 
considering the adoption of more immediate measures to reduce CO2 emissions. These 
transition measures could bridge the gap until the more long-term sustainable options 
are fully developed.  
 
CO2 Capture and Storage  
One of these transition measures is the large-scale implementation of the low-carbon 
energy technology CO2 capture and storage (CCS) (IPCC, 2007). By implementing this 
technology, a large amount of the CO2 emissions released by the burning of fossil fuels 
does not get into the atmosphere. In a nutshell, the technology of CCS exists of a chain 
of three processes. In the first stage, CO2 is captured and purified. CO2 can be captured 
in any process where large amounts of CO2 are released from fossil fuels combustion, 
such as power generation, and oil and gas production. In the second stage, the 
captured CO2 is compressed and transported to a storage site. This can be done either 
by pipeline, ship, rail, or truck. In the third and final step, the purified and compressed 
CO2 is injected into secure deep geological formations that are screened for this 
purpose. Storage sites are often depleted oil or gas fields or saline aquifers, either 
underground or undersea. The CO2 will be stored for an infinite amount of time. The 
large-scale integration of the three processes that together form CCS (capture, 
transport, and storage) is new. However, the processes are already applied separately 
on different scales and under different circumstances. For instance, the food and 
beverage industry uses captured CO2 for the “fizz” in soft drinks, beer, and champagne. 
Furthermore, the oil and gas industry injects CO2 into geologic reservoirs to make it 
easier to remove oil out of the reservoir (enhanced oil recovery). 
 
CO2 capture and storage is a controversial technology. The public debate is strong and 
clusters around several topics. Examples of such topics are whether the technology 
genuinely helps to solve global warming or hampers the development of renewable 
(energy) sources, whether or not the processes can be safely applied on a large scale, 
and whether or not the benefits compensate the financial costs (e.g., van Egmond & 
Hekkert, 2012). Similar debates, clustered around money and safety, also 
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accompany—or have accompanied—the introduction of other controversial, new, and 
complicated issues (i.e., “hard issues”; e.g., Carmines & Stimson, 1980). Examples are 
the implementation of wind energy (Jolivet & Heiskanen, 2010), biofuel (Wright & 
Reid, 2011), and nuclear energy (Arentsen, 2006). A controversial issue that has been 
in the news in recent days is the extraction of shale gas from underground rock 
formations by fracking, which involves injecting chemically treated water deep into the 
ground. Similar to CCS, there is large controversy about shale gas extraction including 
local opposition and support from national government.  
 
Public debate has a large influence on how favorably or unfavorably people perceive 
an issue. This public attitude, in turn, is very relevant for the implementation of 
emergent technologies such as CCS. That is, implementation might be delayed or 
cancelled if the public does not accept the technology. For instance, public resistance 
hindered implementation of nuclear energy in the Netherlands (Arentsen, 2006). More 
recently, in November 2010, a CO2 storage demonstration project in the Dutch town 
Barendrecht was cancelled by the national government; mainly because the local 
residents did not support implementation (Brunsting, de Best-Waldhober, Feenstra, & 
Milkunda, 2011; Terwel, Ter Mors, & Daamen, 2012).  
 
Persuasive Communication  
Attitudes towards controversial issues can be influenced by how these issues are 
communicated to the public. For example, the public opinion about nanotechnology 
can be influenced by the extent to which risks and benefits of the technology are 
described (Cobb, 2005). Similarly, attitudes towards nuclear power can be affected 
when this energy resource is related to climate change mitigation (Jones, Eiser, & 
Gamble, 2012). More than often, these communications are persuasive in nature. 
Persuasive communication can be defined as the process by which a communicator 
(the source) transmits information (the message) about a subject (the issue) to create, 
reinforce, modify, or extinguish the beliefs, attitudes, intentions, motivations, and/or 
behaviors of an audience (the recipient) (e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Gass & Seiter, 
2007; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953).  
 
The impact of persuasive communications can be influenced by characteristics of the 
source, the message, the issue, and the recipient. Dual process models such as the 
heuristic-systematic model (HSM; Chaiken, 1980) and the elaboration likelihood model 
(ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) explain how these aspects relate to each other 
regarding persuasion. Dual process models suggest the existence of an information 
processing continuum with two extreme ends: a systematic (or central) route and a 
heuristic (or peripheral) route. If recipients process a communication systematically, 
they scrutinize all available information to form an opinion. As such, they are 
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persuaded especially by message characteristics. In contrast, if recipients process a 
communication heuristically, they are persuaded by heuristic cues that are unrelated 
to the message, such as characteristics of the source. People will particularly follow a 
more heuristic route of information processing when they are not very motivated, 
involved, or able to process a communication. For instance, when the issue does not 
interest them much, or when they suffer from time constraints or cognitive limitations 
(Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). However, in general, people will use some 
combination of the two routes (Petty, Cacioppo, Strathman, & Priester, 2005). Both 
systematic and heuristic processing can affect persuasion but the amount (e.g., a lot 
versus little) and nature (e.g., positive or negative) of the thinking determines how the 
recipient’s opinion is affected. It is assumed that opinions are more persistent, 
resistant, and predictive of behavior when they are based on systematically processed 
information than on heuristically processed information (Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 
1995).  
 
Research on persuasive communication tends to focus on effectiveness. That is, it 
investigates the extent to which communications influence recipients’ beliefs, 
attitudes, intentions, motivations, and/or behavior. However, less scientific attention 
has gone to how recipients perceive persuasion tactics and how these perceptions 
affect evaluations about the message as well as the source. Because recipients’ 
perceptions and evaluations are relatively neglected, some communication techniques 
might appear to be effective while their possible unfavorable side effects (i.e., pitfalls) 
stay undetected. It is desirable that these pitfalls are identified because unfavorable 
message and source evaluations can have negative effects in turn. For instance, people 
can react against the position advocated in communications because they feel that 
their freedom to make up their own mind is threatened and they need to regain 
control (i.e., psychological reactance; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Such a backfire effect 
has been identified in research that found people to become more negative about CCS 
when they place little trust in the integrity of organizations that support the 
implementation of CCS (Terwel, Harinck, Ellemers, & Daamen, 2009a). Moreover, 
unfavorable evaluations are also linked to several unwanted effects in the long run. 
Examples are consumer protest and boycott, and financial loss for the company (e.g., 
Campbell, 1995; Polonsky, 1995; Polonsky & Rosenberger III, 2001). 
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The Present Research 
The research presented in this dissertation is aimed at identifying potential pitfalls in 
the persuasive communication about CCS. Furthermore, the research examines the 
processes underlying these pitfalls and their boundary conditions. I systematically 
assessed potential pitfalls of three techniques: conveying lots of information at one 
time (i.e., heaping), emphasizing advantages over disadvantages or vice versa (i.e., 
emphasis framing), and citing pro-environmental motives for involvement in CCS (i.e., 
greening).  
 
I primarily focused on communications from oil and gas companies because these 
organizations have applied the above-mentioned techniques in their communications 
about CCS in the past (Brunsting et al., 2011). Oil and gas companies explore, process 
and refine crude oil or natural gas and sell the end products: fuels such as gasoline and 
domestic gas. I compared communications from oil and gas companies with 
communications from other stakeholders that communicate about CCS, such as 
environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) and news agencies, to assess 
if oil and gas companies suffer from corporate image problems that influence the 
effectiveness of their communications (Yoon, Gürhan-Canli, & Schwarz, 2006). 
 
Heaping Information 
A communication technique that potentially has unforeseen effects is heaping: 
conveying lots of information at one time. Oil and gas companies might cumulate 
information about CCS in the hope that one or more chunks of information persuade 
individuals to support implementation of the technology. Moreover, they might heap 
information because recipients easily perceive a lengthy communication as truthful 
(i.e., the length-implies-strength heuristic; e.g., Stec & Bernstein, 1999). These CCS 
communications often contain multiple technical aspects (Corry & Reiner, 2011).  
 
In fact, there is support that consumers can be convinced that a product is “good” 
when an advertisement displays many positive statements about a product (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1984). Furthermore, technical information can be persuasive (Nisbet & 
Mooney, 2007). However, in the case of persuasive communication, a pitfall of heaping 
information lies in the possibility that the most important message does not come 
across when it is buried in a pile of trivia. Communications about CCS often exist of 
more and less relevant chunks of information (Brunsting et al., 2011). Although, in 
principle, only the most relevant message should dictate judgments and beliefs about 
the technology, I propose that irrelevant (nondiagnostic) details can dilute these 
judgments and beliefs (e.g., Meyvis & Janiszewski, 2002; Nisbett, Zukier, & Lemley, 
1981). This dilution effect can make cumulated communications less—instead of 
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more—persuasive. Chapter 2 examines if irrelevant details dilute the persuasiveness of 
relevant information as a pitfall of heaping. 
 
Emphasis Framing 
A second potential communication pitfall regards the unforeseen effects of giving 
more weight to advantages of CCS over disadvantages as a way to nudge people 
towards supporting the technology. This technique is called emphasis framing. 
Emphasis framing can either be strong or subtle. It is strong when only one aspect of 
an issue is communicated and alternative considerations are omitted (i.e., one-sided 
framing). It is subtle when more aspects are communicated, but one aspect is 
emphasized (i.e., two-sided framing). Regardless of its strength, emphasis framing has 
shown to be effective in shaping people’s attitudes. For example, research on attitudes 
towards genetically modified food revealed that participants were more positive about 
this type of food when the positive aspect of combating world hunger was given more 
weight than the negative aspect that the food impacts on biodiversity and the food 
chain (Druckman & Bolsen, 2011).  
 
A potential pitfall of applying emphasis framing is that people might feel they are being 
manipulated when CCS advantages are emphasized over disadvantages (or vice versa). 
Such perceived manipulation could lead to a range of unfavorable (long-term) effects, 
such as negative source evaluations (see Campbell, 1995), and psychological reactance 
(e.g., Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Terwel et al., 2009a). Moreover, this pitfall might 
especially be severe when perceptions of manipulation lead to judgments of source 
illegitimacy or untrustworthiness. This could easily happen when recipients are 
presented with persuasive communications when they expect informative 
communications. Chapter 3 examines if perceptions of manipulation and judgments of 
illegitimacy are pitfalls of emphasis framing. 
 
Greening  
A third pitfall concerns the technique of greening: presenting (corporate) activities as 
being environmentally friendly. Oil and gas companies might be inclined to green their 
involvement in CCS because positive information about a firm’s corporate social 
responsibility can positively affect their reputation (Alniacik, Alniacik, & Genc, 2011; 
Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001). Greening of corporate involvement in CCS might become a 
pitfall if the public suspects that the activity is actually guided by firm-serving motives 
such as image-enhancement or satisfying customers, instead of public-serving motives 
such as care for the environment (Spangler & Pompper, 2011; Terwel, Harinck, 
Ellemers, & Daamen, 2009b). These suspicions of strategic behavior could lead to 
perceptions of corporate greenwashing. That is, that a company misrepresents 
corporate activities as “green” in order to look more environmentally friendly than it 
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actually is (e.g., Laufer, 2003; Vos, 2009). Greenwashing is linked to several long-term 
unwanted effects including consumer protest and boycott, and financial loss for the 
company (e.g., Polonsky, 1995; Polonsky & Rosenberger III, 2001).  
 
An illustration of the potential pitfall of greening is provided by the Go Green 
campaign of British Petroleum (BP). In 2000, BP launched this public relations and 
advertising campaign to show their concern for the environment and to introduce a 
new logo—a green and yellow sun—and new slogan: “Beyond Petroleum” (e.g., 
Muralidharan, Dillistone, & Shin, 2011). However, BP’s green intentions and concerns 
were challenged (García, 2011; LeMenestrel, Van den Hove, & De Bettignies, 2002). 
Moreover, in 2008, BP was publicly accused of corporate greenwashing for announcing 
commitment to alternative energy sources while investing mainly in fossil fuels (“BP 
wins ‘Emerald Paintbrush’ award”, 2008). As such, the Go Green campaign backfired. 
Chapter 4 investigates if perceived greenwashing is a pitfall of greening.  
 
Research Method 
To investigate potential pitfalls of heaping, emphasis framing, and greening in the 
communication about CCS (i.e., the research questions), I conducted experimental and 
survey research.  
 
Experimental research. I conducted experimental research because this method 
enables the examination of causality. That is, in experimental research everything is 
kept constant, but one aspect is systematically varied. For example, if only one aspect 
of a communication (e.g., its relevance) is altered, while all other aspects are kept 
constant, the conclusion can be drawn that differences in the impact of the 
communication (e.g., its persuasiveness) must be due to the altered aspect.  
 
In this dissertation, I altered different aspects of CCS communications depending on 
the research question. More specifically, I varied the relevance of chunks of 
information about CCS to test the weakening effect of irrelevant details on a relevant 
message (Chapter 2). The relative weight on advantages and disadvantages of CCS in a 
news article was altered to test whether or not emphasis framing is perceived as 
manipulative (Chapter 3). Finally, I varied communicated motives for investing in CCS 
on a corporate website to test whether or not a green motive for CCS is perceived as 
greenwashing (Chapter 4). Participants in all experiments were students of Leiden 
University. They were randomly allocated to experimental conditions to ensure that 
individual differences were evenly distributed. As such, differences in the findings 
between experimental conditions could not be attributed to characteristics of specific 
individuals.  
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Survey research. Experimental research with student participants is valuable to 
examine causality and identify specific processes. However, responses of students may 
not be representative for the general public. I conducted a large-scale survey among a 
representative sample of the Dutch public in October 2013 to explore whether 
conclusions drawn on the basis of experimental studies with student populations also 
apply to a broader sample of the general public. To anchor the results obtained with 
student samples, respondents were asked—amongst others—about oil and gas 
companies’ motives to be involved in the development of CCS, and to what extent they 
expected oil and gas companies to try to influence public opinion about CCS. I will refer 
to the survey and its findings throughout this dissertation (Appendix A). 
 
Identified Pitfalls 
The experimental and survey data support the existence of pitfalls in the 
communication about CCS. Moreover, the data provide insight in the circumstances 
under which these pitfalls are most likely to occur as well as their boundary conditions.  
 
First, an important pitfall of heaping information about CCS was identified. The results 
show that adding irrelevant details to a relevant argument in support of CCS can 
reduce the persuasiveness of the relevant argument. Irrelevant details can dilute both 
perceived persuasiveness (Experiment 2.1) as well as actual persuasiveness 
(modifications in beliefs, Experiment 2.3). Irrelevant details can also dilute the 
persuasiveness of relevant arguments against CCS, although the effect is less strong 
(Experiment 2.2). The current research provides an explanation for this dilution effect; 
irrelevant details impair the perceived overall quality of a communication (Experiment 
2.3). I also discovered that heaping information is not necessarily harmful for the 
persuasiveness of a message. That is, the persuasiveness of a message is not diluted 
when arguments are added that point in the same direction as the key message but 
are less strong (i.e., moderately relevant information). However, this addition does not 
make the message more persuasive either (Experiment 2.1; Experiment 2.2).  
 
Based on the above, an effective way to convince people of the benefits of CCS would 
be to spare details and only share information that is supportive of CCS. However, the 
present research reveals that this may raise another pitfall. That is, people perceive 
biased CCS communications as manipulative. More specifically, communications that 
emphasize advantages of the technology over disadvantages (or vice versa) are 
perceived as significantly more manipulative than balanced communications. 
Manipulation is perceived regardless of whether a communication only contains 
arguments for or against CCS and any competitive arguments are omitted (Experiment 
3.1), or whether it contains both pro and con arguments, but with an emphasis on one 
of them (Experiment 3.1; Experiment 3.2). 
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Also as predicted, oil and gas companies that green their corporate interest in CCS can 
be perceived as greenwashing (see all experiments reported in Chapter 4). People 
suspect that the main motives for companies to be involved in the development of CCS 
are firm-serving (Experiment 4.2; Experiment 4.3; Appendix A). This suspicion leads to 
perceptions of corporate greenwashing (Experiment 4.2; Experiment 4.3). The present 
research further reveals this is the default expectation. That is, oil and gas companies 
are even perceived as greenwashing when they do not motivate their involvement in 
CCS at all (Experiment 4.1). This effect might be due to the fact that organizations that 
emit large amounts of CO2 by combusting fossil fuels are perceived as hypocritical 
when they develop a measure that helps to combat global warming (cf. Yoon et al., 
2006). However, I also discovered that oil and gas companies can restrain perceptions 
of greenwashing by providing an economic motive for their investment in CCS. For 
instance, oil and gas companies may acknowledge publicly that they invest because 
they anticipate that the investment is profitable in the long run (see all experiments 
reported in Chapter 4). An economic motive is in line with what the public expects 
from this type of organization (Appendix A). Therefore, this motive is credible and 
people appreciate honest motives (Terwel et al., 2009a).  
 
Role of Communication Source  
I demonstrate that characteristics of the communication source play an important role 
in how communications about CCS are perceived and evaluated. This is consistent with 
prior studies (e.g., Rabinovich, Morton, & Birney, 2012; Ter Mors, Weenig, Ellemers, & 
Daamen, 2010; Terwel et al., 2009b).  
 
Source presence. The mere presence (versus absence) of source information affects 
the persuasiveness of a message. Specifically, I found that source presence moderates 
the effect of heaping on the persuasiveness of CCS communications. That is, irrelevant 
details only dilute the persuasiveness of relevant arguments when recipients do not 
know the identity of the source. The dilution effect does not occur when it is clear who 
is communicating. This boundary condition for the dilution effect emerges when an oil 
and gas company is the source, but also when an ENGO communicates about CCS 
(Experiment 2.3). This finding is consistent with dual process models (Chaiken, 1980; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986); persuasive communications about CCS are easily processed 
heuristically because the general public may not be very involved in the issue. As a 
result, source information—when salient—can function as a heuristic cue that affects 
the persuasiveness of the communications. When no source information is available, 
persuasiveness will be affected mainly by characteristics of the message (such as its 
relevance) which allows for occurrence of the dilution effect.  
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Source type. Dual process models can also explain the influence of type of source on 
perceptions of manipulation. That is, the current research indicates that people 
perceive the same (balanced or biased) message as more manipulative when it comes 
from an oil and gas company than when it comes from a news agency (Experiment 
3.2). This again shows that a CCS message is evaluated primarily based on source 
characteristics rather than on message characteristics, and that oil and gas companies 
are generally expected to be more manipulative than news agencies (Experiment 3.2; 
Appendix A). Furthermore, the type of source determines whether or not people 
perceive manipulation through emphasis framing as legitimate. That is, manipulation 
by a news agency is judged as relatively unacceptable (compared to the provision of a 
balanced message), but perceptions of manipulation are less clearly related to 
judgments of illegitimacy when an oil and gas company frames its communications 
about CCS in this way (Experiment 3.2).  
 
Effectiveness of Persuasive Communication 
I also examined whether or not people’s (negative) message or source evaluations 
would impair the effectiveness of persuasive communications regarding modifying 
people’s beliefs and attitudes. I discovered that the effectiveness of emphasis framing 
is not impaired by people’s negative perceptions about this technique. That is, 
although people do perceive emphasis framing (pro or con) as manipulative, their 
attitude towards CCS is still moved into the framed direction. As such that people have 
a more positive attitude towards CCS when communications emphasize advantages of 
the technology compared to when more weight is given to disadvantages (Experiment 
3.1). In contrast, I found that the effectiveness of a communication can be impaired 
when information is heaped. More specifically, adding irrelevant information (but not 
moderately relevant information) raises negative message perceptions. That is, 
irrelevant details impair the perceived quality of a communication that puts CCS 
forward as a measure that helps to combat global warming. This in turn decreases the 





Individual differences between people can make them more or less sensitive to 
persuasive communication techniques (e.g., Petty et al., 2005). The survey data 
support this by revealing a relation between individual environmental views and 
expectations about honest CCS communications (Appendix A). I ensured that these 
individual differences would not contribute to the main experimental findings by 
randomly allocating participants to conditions. Randomization made it redundant to 
                                                 
1
 In the survey, I also assessed people’s overall attitude towards CCS. I found that people are slightly more 
positive towards the technology than negative (M = 4.49, SD = 1.45 on a scale from 1 [negative] to 7 
[positive], t(844) = 9.76, p < .001). See Appendix A. 
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verify whether observed effects should be attributed to individual characteristics. 
However, for exploratory reasons, I did examine whether a priori familiarity with CCS 
and dispositional skepticism towards organizational communications might moderate 
the effects of communication techniques. I discovered that familiarity with CCS did not 
moderate any of the effects, but dispositional skepticism made a difference in people’s 
responses to the use of greening. People who are not very skeptical evaluate the use 
of greening as negative because it raises suspicions of strategic behavior. This indirect 
effect does not hold true for so-called communication skeptics. Probably because 
communication skeptics always doubt the truthfulness of communications, regardless 
of their contents (Experiment 4.3). 
 
Implications of the Findings 
The research presented in this dissertation has clear implications for organizations that 
have an interest in CCS. However, it also has implications for scientists who study the 
effects of persuasive communication as well as for the general public that is 
confronted with these communications.  
 
Implications for Organizations 
Awareness of pitfalls in the use of heaping, emphasis framing, and greening in the 
communication about CCS is important for both organizations that support the 
technology and organizations that oppose it. However, awareness seems to be 
particularly relevant for organizations with an interest in the implementation of CCS 
projects because, in the past, these organizations have applied the techniques I 
examined. For example, partners of the CO2 storage demonstration project in 
Barendrecht produced lengthy communications that were not always completely 
relevant, and the information that they shared was relatively biased (Brunsting et al., 
2011). Furthermore, the main industrial partner of the project, multinational oil and 
gas company Shell, claimed that climate change mitigation was the main reason for the 
company’s involvement in the project (and not profitability), but Shell refuted 
alternative views on how to approach climate change mitigation (Brunsting et al., 
2011). 
 
Whether or not the Barendrecht partners applied heaping, emphasis framing, and 
greening in their communications strategically (i.e., with the purpose to persuade), the 
current research acquaints them with the fact that these techniques have potential 
pitfalls. If the partners had been aware of these pitfalls at the time, they might have 
communicated in a more balanced, relevant, and credible manner. Consequently, it 
would have been possible that residents’ were more positive about implementation of 
the demonstration project. In short, the identification of pitfalls in the communication 
18 |Chapter 1  
 
about CCS is very relevant for organizations with an interest in the implementation of 
CCS.  
 
Although I focused on stakeholders with an interest in achieving CCS projects, I 
demonstrated that awareness of pitfalls is also relevant for organizations that are 
more interested in cancellation of CCS projects. An example of such an organization is 
the activist group ‘CO2isNee’ (i.e., CO2isNo) that fiercely argued against the 
Barendrecht project through publications on its website, messages in local 
newspapers, and public meetings (Brunsting et al., 2011; Terwel et al., 2012). I showed 
that relevant arguments against implementation of CCS can—just as relevant pro 
arguments—be diluted by irrelevant information. Furthermore, emphasizing 
disadvantages over advantages in CCS communications is perceived as manipulative as 
the reverse. In sum, both proponents and opponents should be aware of pitfalls in the 
communication about CCS. 
 
Source disclosure. It would seem that companies with an economic interest in CCS can 
avoid some of the identified pitfalls by activating their source characteristics. After all, I 
demonstrated that oil and gas companies could inoculate themselves to the diluting 
effect of irrelevant details by making their corporate identity explicit in their 
communications. Furthermore, it appears as if the pitfalls of emphasis framing are 
merely of concern for sources that are expected to be objective; oil and gas companies 
can emphasize CCS advantages over disadvantages without being accused of 
illegitimate manipulation. This conclusion needs nuance, though. Revealing corporate 
identity does not guarantee an easy transfer of a relevant CCS message for oil and gas 
companies. In contrast, disclosure will probably activate negative perceptions. That is, 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation shows that people suspect oil and gas companies to be 
primarily driven by firm-serving motives which easily raises perceptions of 
greenwashing. Disclosure might even backfire in a sense that it can make 
communication techniques less instead of more effective. That is, I found that oil and 
gas companies suffer from a relatively negative image, corresponding to earlier 
research (e.g., Terwel et al., 2009b; Yoon et al., 2006). This negative image could 
decrease the effectiveness of persuasive communication techniques (Druckman, 
2001).  
 
Although persuasive communication should be practiced with caution, the current 
findings do not implicate that persuasion should be avoided completely. Instead, the 
findings implicate that CCS stakeholders can provide persuasive communications 
effectively as long as the content is relevant (to avoid the diluting effect of irrelevant 
details) and the message is credible (to avoid being evaluated negatively when the 
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public does not believe what is being said). Moreover, the communications should be 
in line with the expectations of the audience. 
 
Expectations. Extending prior research (e.g., Hinnant, Len-Ríos, & Jee Oh, 2012), the 
current findings elucidate that expectations play an important role in how people 
respond to persuasive communications. This is the case, for instance, with 
expectations about manipulation and expectations about the message. People’s 
attitudes are determined by expectations and the evaluations of those expectations 
(expectancy violations theory; see Burgoon & Le Poire, 1993). Therefore, those 
communicating about CCS should take the expectations of the public into account, 
even if these expectations are not completely in line with reality. I have demonstrated 
that stakeholders with a specific interest in CCS can practice persuasive 
communication techniques effectively when they act upon people’s expectations. For 
example, oil and gas companies can prevent perceptions of greenwashing if they 
communicate a motive for their investment in CCS that the public expects: an 
economic motive.  
 
Informative versus persuasive communication. Not only stakeholders with a specific 
interest in achieving or preventing implementation of CCS should take the 
expectations of the public into account. I demonstrated that expectations are also very 
relevant for communicators who have a supposedly more objective view on CCS, such 
as the media. Because these sources are expected to be objective, it pays for them to 
be reserved in their practice of persuasive communication. Instead, these sources do 
better to provide informative, balanced communications about the technology to 
avoid accusations of illegitimate manipulation.  
 
Questions can be raised about what pitfalls might occur when sources that are 
expected to provide subjective information (e.g., oil and gas companies or activist 
groups) provide informative communications about CCS, instead of persuasive 
communications. For example, one may ask whether or not it is likely that partners of 
a CCS project encounter any unforeseen effects when they set up a local information 
center (as the national government and Shell did in Barendrecht, Brunsting et al., 
2011). 
 
Sharing neutral information might not be the first-choice strategy for stakeholders 
with a clear interest in achieving or preventing implementation of CCS. That is, their 
aim is to influence public opinions about the technology, and a balanced message does 
not likely reach that goal. In contrast, a biased message—for or against 
implementation—can nudge attitudes towards CCS into the preferred direction. 
Therefore, stakeholders with a specific interest probably prefer persuasive 
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communication over informative communication. However, I demonstrated that the 
use of persuasive communication techniques comes with a cost. That is, framing can 
be perceived as manipulative. And although these perceptions of manipulation are not 
judged as inappropriate for stakeholders with an interest in CCS, they could lead to a 
range of negative effects in the long run, such as negative source evaluations (see 
Campbell, 1995), and psychological reactance (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Terwel et al., 
2009a). Furthermore, greening can lead to perceived greenwashing which, in turn, is 
linked to several long-term unwanted effects including consumer protest and boycott, 
and financial loss for the company (e.g., Polonsky, 1995; Polonsky & Rosenberger III, 
2001).  
 
Inversely, I demonstrated that informative communications are perceived as 
significantly less manipulative than persuasive communications. Informative 
communications could lead to positive long-term effects for an organization, such as 
increased trust in its integrity (cf. Terwel et al., 2009a). As such, it is not such a bad 
idea for stakeholders with an interest in CCS to inform instead of persuade. However, 
informative communication should also be used with caution. That is, informative 
communication from sources with a specific interest in an issue could look like 
persuasion under the cover of education. This is also known as propaganda: a form of 
communication that attempts to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of 
the propagandist and is often associated with unethical, harmful, and unfair tactics 
(Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012). To avoid perceptions of propaganda, stakeholders could 
share information about CCS in collaboration with stakeholders with competing views. 
For example, a local ENGO could cooperate with an oil and gas company. Collaborative 
information is perceived as more valuable because people expect that diverse 
perspectives are represented (Ter Mors et al., 2010).  
 
In sum, when bias is expected, a relevant and credible persuasive message about CCS 
will be accepted, and informative communication will not be rejected (as long as it is 
not perceived as propaganda). However, when balance is expected, only informative 
communication will be accepted and a persuasive message will be rejected.  
 
Scientific Contribution 
As stated before, researchers who study persuasive communication techniques tend to 
focus on the short-term effectiveness of these techniques, for instance on the extent 
to which these techniques affect people’s attitude towards an issue. However, up till 
now, less scientific attention has been given to how people perceive these techniques 
and how those perceptions affect evaluations about the message and the source (that 
can have long-term implications for reputation and perceived trustworthiness).  
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Therefore, the main scientific contribution of the current research is that it clarifies 
that although persuasive communication techniques can be effective in the short run, 
they can at the same time lead to unforeseen, unfavorable evaluations in the long run. 
Stated differently, the present research has made clear the importance to include, in 
future research, the examination of communication pitfalls and their effects, that were 
often neglected in prior research. Furthermore, the current findings indicate that 
scientists should also take people’s expectations into account because they play a large 
role in how people perceive messages and communication sources.  
 
Implications for Recipients 
The present research also has implications for recipients of information about CCS. 
Recipients can approach messages in a more critical manner when they learn about 
the processes that are instigated by persuasive communication techniques. 
Forewarning people of the existence of persuasive tactics can help them resist 
persuasion (see Benoit, 1998), especially if their illusions of invulnerability to 
persuasion are dispelled (e.g., Sagarin, Cialdini, Rice, & Serna, 2002). The current 
research shows that people who are already skeptical towards organizational 
communications and/or have relatively profound environmental concerns show a 
critical approach towards CCS communications. Becoming aware of the insights of the 
current research might also instill a more critical approach in people who are less 
skeptical by nature or less concerned about the environment. As more critical 
consumers, people can more effectively use public communications to derive an 
informed opinion about difficult issues such as CCS. 
 
Beyond the Present Research 
The research presented in this dissertation is set up in a rather broad way; 
experimental and survey research are presented and related to theory and results 
obtained in the literature from the fields of psychology, political science, marketing, 
and communication science. Despite this broad set-up, the research has its 
restrictions, which of course also presents opportunities for future research. Specific 
limitations and opportunities of the separate lines of research are discussed in some 
detail at the end of Chapters 2, 3, and 4. In addition, I will now discuss two general 
aspects of the present research that offer opportunities for further research.  
 
Issue Characteristics and Information-Processing 
The current research was carried out in the context of CATO-2, a large-scale Dutch 
research and development program on the low-carbon energy technology CCS, which 
prescribed the focus on communication about this technology. However, the pitfalls 
identified in the communication about CCS are likely to arise also in the 
communication about other new complex technologies. Especially when these 
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communications apply to issues in the environmental domain, such as the adoption of 
nuclear energy, biofuel, wind energy, or shale gas. In the case of more familiar, 
interesting issues about which people easily form an opinion (i.e., “easy issues”; e.g., 
Carmines & Stimson, 1980), different concerns might play a role, making it less likely 
for the pitfalls identified in the current research to arise.  
 
To predict possible occurrence of the identified pitfalls, it might be more useful to 
focus on level of information-processing than on issue characteristics. Namely, as I 
argued earlier in this thesis, occurrence of the pitfalls is probably largely related to how 
deeply a communication is processed. More specifically, the pitfalls identified in the 
current research were likely to arise because the communications had been processed 
heuristically due to low involvement and low motivation. This implicates that the 
pitfalls of heaping, emphasis framing, and greening are likely to occur in any 
communication that is processed heuristically. Most probably, these communications 
are about difficult issues, such as CCS. However, according to the dual process models, 
these can be communications about all types of issues that people are not very 
involved in (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  
 
In contrast, when people are very involved in an issue, they process communications in 
a more systematic than heuristic manner and rely more on message cues than on 
heuristic cues (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). These are likely to be familiar 
and interesting issues. However, the issues can also be difficult, such as CCS. For 
example, residents who live near a planned CCS storage site are very involved in CCS 
and will probably take a more systematic than heuristic route to process information 
about the storage site and the technology. As a result, some of the pitfalls identified in 
the present research might not arise. That is, in this case, source presence might not 
overrule the diluting effect of irrelevant information on the persuasiveness of relevant 
information. Furthermore, evaluations of communications from these people might be 
more clearly influenced by specific expectations, such as the belief that local 
properties will fall in value and accidents might happen (e.g., Terwel et al., 2012). 
Because residents might be focused merely on information against the issue, pro-CCS 
information might be perceived as untrue and manipulative, regardless of the source 
(selective exposure; Frey, 1986; Hart et al., 2009; Smith, Fabrigar, & Norris, 2008). 
Finally, these residents might be less sensitive to persuasive communication than 
people with a less strong opinion (Brewer, 2001, Joslyn & Haider-Markel, 2002).  
 
In conclusion, the pitfalls identified in the present research might occur in particular 
when persuasive communications are processed in a more heuristic manner. Different 
psychological processes and pitfalls might come into play when communications are 
processed more systematically. Future research might further explore the role of 
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information-processing in the communication about CCS. For example, experiments 
can be conducted to unravel the individual effects of issue-difficulty (easy vs. difficult) 
and level of information-processing (heuristic vs. systematic) on evaluations of 
persuasive communication techniques.  
 
One-way versus Two-way Communication 
The current research examined a type of communication that did not allow for any 
explicit feedback from the recipient (i.e., one-way communication; e.g., Grunig & Hunt, 
1984). However, people might be more positive about CCS if they receive an 
opportunity to voice their opinion about the issue (e.g., Terwel, Harinck, Ellemers, & 
Daamen, 2010). Future research might examine the effectiveness and pitfalls of 
communication strategies that are interactive, such as social media (i.e., two-way 
communication; e.g., Grunig & Hunt, 1984).  
 
I suspect that parallel with one-way communication, two-way communication is 
effective, but also has pitfalls. On the one hand, two-way communication might be 
more effective in influencing peoples attitude towards the implementation of CCS 
because people experience increased feelings of fairness, trust, and respect when they 
can voice their opinion and concerns (procedural justice; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & 
Walker, 1975). On the other hand, the potential pitfall here is that the possibility to 
give feedback can be perceived as pseudo voice when people perceive decision makers 
to create an illusion of voice opportunity, without the intention to actually use their 
input (de Vries, Jehn, & Terwel, 2012). Pseudo voice can be perceived when residents 
of areas near planned CCS storage sites think that the national government has already 
made the decision to implement the site, but engage the public merely to heighten a 
sense of trust and appear democratic. These residents will probably feel mistreated 
when they suspect pseudo voice and might act against the project because they are 
frustrated about this (de Vries et al., 2012). Thus, opening a dialogue about CCS might 
backfire if people perceive the opportunity to give voice as pseudo voice.  
 
Future research can be aimed at examining the factors that determine whether the 
provision of voice opportunity leads to positive or negative effects in the context of the 
implementation of CCS or a similar issue, such as the extraction of shale gas from 
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Conclusion 
One of the greatest environmental challenges the world is facing today is combating 
global warming. Global warming is largely due to growing concentrations of human-
induced CO2 emissions. One of the solutions to mitigate these emissions is the 
implementation of CO2 capture and storage (CCS). CCS is a controversial technology, 
and attitudes towards it are influenced by public communications. Proponents as well 
as opponents use persuasive communication techniques to convince the public of their 
views. Examples of such techniques are conveying lots of information at one time 
(heaping), giving more weight to either advantages or disadvantages (emphasis 
framing), and citing pro-environmental motives for involvement in CCS (greening). 
These techniques tend to be judged on their effectiveness but, up till now, less 
attention went to how (unfavorable) recipients might evaluate a communication in 
which persuasive techniques are applied as well as the source that produced it. Yet, 
these message and source evaluations are important because they can have long-term 
costs for the communicators’ reputation and performance. Because message and 
source evaluations are rather neglected, it might appear as if it is effective to apply 
persuasive techniques to the communication about CCS, while possible negative side-
effects stay undetected. Stated differently, communication about CCS can have pitfalls.  
The experimental and survey research presented in this dissertation identified pitfalls 
in the use of heaping, emphasis framing, and greening. That is, the results show that 
irrelevant details can dilute the persuasiveness of a relevant message, giving more 
weight to either advantages or disadvantages is perceived as manipulative—even as 
illegitimate when people expect informative communications—and citing pro-
environmental motives for involvement in CCS can be perceived as greenwashing. 
Furthermore, the research reveals the psychological processes underlying these pitfalls 
and their boundary conditions. Expectations about the communication source appear 
to play an important role in how the use of persuasive techniques is perceived. To 
avoid long-term negative perceptions, stakeholders with an interest in CCS can best 
take people’s source expectations into account and provide a relevant, balanced and 
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with less relevant information. This is important to examine because persuasiveness 
plays a central role in the attitude formation process (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1981). On 
the one hand, previous studies suggest that a message’s persuasiveness may increase 
with length (i.e., the length-implies-strength heuristic; e.g., Stec & Bernstein, 1999). 
Thus, it might be useful to increase the length of communications about CCS by adding 
less relevant arguments (or perhaps even information that is irrelevant for attitude 
formation) to the most relevant argument in order to increase the persuasiveness of 
public communications. On the other hand, based on insights from research on the 
dilution effect (e.g., Nisbett et al., 1981), one might anticipate the added information 
to weaken the impact of the relevant argument. This would make public 
communications less instead of more persuasive. That is, although only the most 
relevant information should dictate people’s judgments and beliefs, less relevant 
details can cause people to alter their judgments (Nisbett et al., 1981). The main 
question that we intend to answer is whether adding less relevant information to 
relevant information makes communications about CCS more or less persuasive than 
sharing merely the most relevant information. 
 
The Dilution Effect  
The dilution effect has been defined as “a judgment bias in which the presence of 
nondiagnostic cues, when processed along with diagnostic cues, causes a judge to 
under-weigh the diagnostic cues” (Waller & Zimbelman, 2003, p. 254). This bias has 
been documented by researchers from various disciplines and across different settings. 
Research has revealed dilution in relation to the effects of stereotypical information on 
impression formation (Nisbett et al., 1981; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989) and the effects of 
auditing cues on financial evaluations (Ettenson, Shanteau, & Krogstad, 1987). 
Furthermore, the dilution effect plays a role in juror decisions (Smith, Stasson, & 
Hawkes, 1998) and product evaluations (Meyvis & Janiszewski, 2002). For example, 
Meyvis and Janiszweski (2002) found that consumers’ beliefs about the speed of a 
computer were diluted when relevant information (“this computer has a very powerful 
processor”) was mixed with irrelevant information (“this computer can be ordered 
online”). Up till now, the dilution effect has not been examined in regard to 
evaluations of the persuasiveness of communications. 
 
Prior research on the dilution effect has mainly focused on the effects of adding 
irrelevant (i.e., nondiagnostic) information to relevant information, while less is known 
about the possible diluting effect of moderately relevant information (i.e., less strong 
than highly relevant information, but pointing in the same direction). At first sight, it 
might seem logical to assume that if irrelevant information dilutes the impact of 
relevant information, moderately relevant information has a similar effect. Indeed, this 
would be in line with the human tendency to average evaluations of different pieces of 
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information into a single evaluative judgment (i.e., the averaging bias, Lichtenstein, 
Earle, & Slovic, 1975). Nevertheless, Tetlock and Boettger (1989) found no dilution 
effect when people had to predict a student’s study performance after reading 
relevant information as well as information that was moderately relevant for this 
prediction. Moreover, Meyvis and Janiszewski (2002) suggest that moderately relevant 
information can even strengthen the persuasiveness of highly relevant information. 
They showed that participants who evaluated the speed of a computer were more 
confident that a computer was fast when they had received both highly relevant 
information and three pieces of moderately relevant information than when they had 
only received the relevant information.  
 
Based on the above, we hypothesize that the persuasiveness of highly relevant 
information is diluted when irrelevant information is added (Hypothesis 2.1). 
Furthermore, we explore whether or not adding moderately relevant information also 
alters the persuasiveness of highly relevant information.  
 
Experiment 2.1 
Experiment 2.1 examines the hypothesis that the persuasiveness of a highly relevant 
pro-CCS argument is diluted when irrelevant information is added (Hypothesis 2.1). It 
furthermore explores the effect of adding moderately relevant pro-CCS information.  
 
Method 
Participants and design. Seventy-nine undergraduate students from Leiden University 
participated in the study. They were randomly allocated to either one of three 
experimental conditions (Information Relevance: highly relevant vs. highly relevant + 
moderately relevant vs. highly relevant + irrelevant) and received either €1 or course 
credits for their participation.  
 
Procedure. Participants first received some general background information about 
energy production and CO2 emissions, and a brief description of CCS. Next, participants 
in the ‘highly relevant’ condition read a pro-CCS argument that a pilot study had 





                                                 
2
 The pilot study (N = 50) was conducted in March 2011 and served to identify arguments for and against the 
implementation of CCS that varied in perceived relevance. The identification of irrelevant information was 
not part of the pilot study because this type of information was already anticipated to be quite irrelevant for 
the purpose of forming an opinion, due to its non-directional nature. Individuals who participated in the pilot 
study were not allowed to participate in the subsequent experiments.  
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By implementing CCS, approximately 90 percent of the CO2 
emissions released by the burning of fossil fuels can be captured. 
This helps to combat global warming because the CO2 is not 
released into the air. 
 
Participants in the ‘highly relevant + moderately relevant’ condition read the highly 
relevant pro-CCS information complemented with three pro-CCS arguments that the 
pilot study had identified as moderately relevant:  
 
A small proportion of the captured CO2 can be used for the 
production of carbonated drinks. By implementing CCS, 
approximately 90 percent of the CO2 emissions released by the 
burning of fossil fuels can be captured. This helps to combat global 
warming because the CO2 is not released into the air. Dutch 
companies can qualify for European subsidies so that they do not 
have to finance the development of CCS completely by themselves. 
Also, as one of the main developers of CCS, the Netherlands can 
export knowledge of the technology to foreign countries. 
 
Participants in the ‘highly relevant + irrelevant’ condition read the highly relevant pro-
CCS information complemented with three pieces of irrelevant information about CCS. 
 
In English, CCS is referred to as “CO2 storage” or “CO2 
sequestration”. In French also two terms are used, namely “CO2 
stockage” and “CO2 séquestration”. By implementing CCS, 
approximately 90 percent of the CO2 emissions released by the 
burning of fossil fuels can be captured. This helps to combat global 
warming because the CO2 is not released into the air. September 
last year, a conference on CCS was held in Amsterdam. A lot of 
information on CCS is available on the internet, for example at 
Wikipedia.  
 
After reading these communications, participants completed a questionnaire that 
included items to measure the persuasiveness of the communications and the 
perceived relevance of the different pieces of information (this measure served as the 




Persuasiveness of communications. The persuasiveness of the communications was 
measured with two separate questions that assessed how convincing and strong 
participants perceived the communications (1 = not at all convincing/strong; 7 = very 
convincing/strong). Responses to these questions were averaged to form an index of 
persuasiveness of communications (α = .78).  
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Manipulation check. To assess the adequacy of the manipulation, we asked all 
participants to indicate the relevance and importance of the highly relevant pro-CCS 
argument (i.e., CCS helps to combat global warming), the three moderately relevant 
pro-CCS arguments (i.e., carbonated drinks, subsidies, knowledge export), and the 
three pieces of irrelevant information (i.e., foreign names, conference, internet) (1 = 
not at all relevant/important; 7 = very relevant/important). Responses were averaged 
to form three separate overall indices of perceived relevance (highly relevant pro-CCS 
information, α = .83; moderately relevant pro-CCS information averaged across the 




Manipulation check. As intended, participants regarded the highly relevant argument 
in favor of CCS as significantly more relevant (M = 5.62, SD = 1.07) than the moderately 
relevant pro-CCS information (M = 4.20, SD = 0.93), t(78) = 10.41, p < .001. In turn, they 
regarded the moderately relevant pro-CCS information as significantly more relevant 
than the irrelevant information (M = 2.48, SD = 1.02), t(78) = 13.69, p < .001. In 
addition, we checked for potential between-subjects effects but did not find any (Fs ≤ 
1.13, ps ≥ .33).  
 
Persuasiveness of communications. We performed an analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
with Information Relevance as the independent variable and persuasiveness of the 
communications as the dependent variable, which revealed a significant between-
subjects effect, F(2, 76) = 3.34, p = .04, ηp
2
 = .08. We then looked at two planned 
contrasts to determine specific differences regarding persuasiveness between 
conditions. A planned contrast between the ‘highly relevant’ and the ‘highly relevant + 
irrelevant’ conditions showed a significant difference, F(1, 76) = 5.59, p = .02, ηp
2
 = .07. 
Participants found the highly relevant argument more persuasive in isolation (M = 
4.69, SD = 0.93) than when it was mixed with irrelevant information (M = 3.92, SD = 
1.32). Furthermore, a planned contrast between the ‘highly relevant’ and ‘highly 
relevant + moderately relevant’ conditions did not show a significant difference, F(1, 
76) = 0.14, p = .71. Participants found the communications equally persuasive, 
regardless of whether these consisted of a mix of highly relevant and moderately 
relevant arguments in favor of CCS (M = 4.57, SD = 1.13) or only consisted of the highly 
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Table 2.1.  
Means (and standard deviations) for persuasiveness of communications as a function of 
information relevance (Experiment 2.1 and Experiment 2.2). 
 
 
Pro-CCS communications  
(Experiment 2.1) 
 







































All in all, the results of Experiment 2.1 offer support for Hypothesis 2.1: Irrelevant 
information diluted the persuasiveness of a highly relevant argument in favor of CCS. 




Experiment 2.2 aims to replicate the results of Experiment 2.1, but this time we focus 
on information against the implementation of CCS. The fact that negative information 
is often processed differently (e.g., more thoroughly) and can have a stronger impact 
than positive information (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001) 
may have implications for the magnitude of the dilution effect. Therefore, we think it is 
useful to examine whether or not adding irrelevant information to relevant con-CCS 
information has a similar effect on persuasiveness as adding irrelevant information to 
relevant pro-CCS information does. 
 
Method 
Participants and design. Ninety-nine undergraduate students from Leiden University 
participated in the study. They were randomly allocated to either one of three 
experimental conditions (Information Relevance: highly relevant vs. highly relevant + 
moderately relevant vs. highly relevant + irrelevant) and received either €1 or course 
credits for their participation. Individuals who participated in the pilot study or in 
Experiment 2.1 were not allowed to participate in Experiment 2.2. 
 
Procedure. As in the previous experiment, participants first received some general 
background information and a brief description of CCS. Next, participants in the ‘highly 
relevant’ condition read an argument against the implementation of CCS that the pilot 
study had identified as highly relevant:  
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The different processes that CCS consists of (capture, transport, and 
storage) are in general industrial use for several years but the 
integrated chain of these processes has never been implemented 
before, which is why safety cannot be completely guaranteed yet. 
 
Participants in the ‘highly relevant + moderately relevant’ condition read the highly 
relevant argument against CCS complemented with three con-CCS arguments that the 
pilot study had identified as moderately relevant:  
 
The implementation of CCS in the Netherlands is just a drop in the 
ocean as long as other countries are unwilling to sign the 
international climate change agreement that obliges rich countries 
world-wide to emit 5.2 percent less greenhouse gasses between 
2008 and 2012 compared to the level of 1990. The different 
processes that CCS consists of (capture, transport, and storage) are 
in general industrial use for several years but the integrated chain of 
these processes has never been implemented before, which is why 
safety cannot be completely guaranteed yet. The CO2 that is stored 
underground cannot be used for other purposes, such as the 
production of carbonated drinks. The mitigation of CO2 emissions is 
not so much the problem of the Netherlands; large, polluting 
countries such as China and the USA should solve the problem. 
 
Participants in the ‘highly relevant + irrelevant’ condition read the highly relevant con-
CCS argument complemented with the same three pieces of irrelevant information as 
used in Experiment 2.1.  
 
Participants then completed a similar questionnaire as in Experiment 2.1, which 
included items to measure the persuasiveness of communications (α = .83), the 
perceived relevance of the highly relevant information (α = .63), the perceived 
relevance of the moderately relevant con CCS information (α = .73), and the perceived 
relevance of the irrelevant information (α = .78). Finally, participants were debriefed, 
paid, and thanked for their participation.  
 
Results  
Manipulation check. As intended (and consistent with the results of the pilot study), 
participants regarded the highly relevant argument against CCS as significantly more 
relevant (M = 5.56, SD = 0.88) than the moderately relevant con-CCS information (M = 
3.75, SD = 1.15), t(98) = 12.54, p < .001, which, in turn, was regarded as significantly 
more relevant than the irrelevant information (M = 2.73, SD = 1.14), t(98) = 7.82, p < 
.001. In addition, we checked for potential between-subjects effects but did not find 
any (Fs ≤ 1.98, ps ≥ .14).  
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Persuasiveness of communications. An ANOVA with Information Relevance as the 
independent variable and persuasiveness of communications as the dependent 
variable revealed a marginally significant effect, F(2, 96) = 2.72, p = .07, ηp
2
 = .05. As in 
the previous experiment, we then looked at two planned contrasts to determine 
specific differences regarding persuasiveness between conditions. A planned contrast 
between the ‘highly relevant’ and ‘highly relevant + irrelevant’ conditions showed that 
communications were regarded as slightly less persuasive when they consisted of a 
mix of highly relevant con-CCS information and irrelevant information (M = 3.83, SD = 
1.18) than when they only consisted of the highly relevant con-CCS argument (M = 
4.35, SD = 1.24), F(1, 96) = 3.49, p = .07, ηp
2
 = .04. A planned contrast between the 
‘highly relevant’ and ‘highly relevant + moderately relevant’ conditions did not show 
any indication of the dilution effect, F(1, 96) = 0.08, p = .78. Participants regarded a mix 
of highly relevant and moderately relevant con-CCS information as equally persuasive 
(M = 4.42, SD = 0.92) as the highly relevant con-CCS information in isolation (M = 4.35, 
SD = 1.24).  
 
In sum, the results of Experiment 2.2 offer weak support for Hypothesis 2.1 when it 
comes to negative information: Irrelevant information only slightly diluted the 
persuasiveness of highly relevant information against CCS. Furthermore, as in 
Experiment 2.1, the results show that moderately relevant con-CCS information did 
not dilute.  
 
Experiment 2.3 
Experiment 2.3 aims to replicate the finding that irrelevant information can dilute the 
persuasiveness of a relevant argument. Furthermore, Experiment 2.3 extends the 
previous experiments in three important ways.  
 
First, we measure participants’ belief that CCS yields benefits for the climate on earth 
after they have read the communications about CCS. Note that in this experiment we 
focus on pro-CCS information because the previous experiments show the clearest 
dilution effect for pro-CCS information. From an applied perspective, it is particularly 
relevant to measure actual beliefs as a sign of the persuasiveness of the 
communications (to complement the insights derived from the relatively 
straightforward self-report items that we used in the previous experiments). After all, 
CCS stakeholders determine the effectiveness of their communications by whether or 
not they have managed to convince people of the advantages (in the case of 
proponents) or disadvantages (in the case of opponents) associated with CCS. If the 
impact of the highly relevant argument that CCS helps to combat global warming is 
diluted by adding irrelevant information (Hypothesis 2.1), then the belief that the 
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implementation of CCS would yield important benefits for the earth’s climate should 
thus be weaker if irrelevant information is added.  
 
Second, we examine two possible explanations for the dilution effect, namely that it 
may be due to (1) a potential decrease in the perceived quality of the communications 
and/or (2) attention distraction as a result of adding irrelevant information to a highly 
relevant argument. The latter idea connects to work by Harp and Mayer (1998), which 
shows that details in text books may distract the reader’s attention from the main text 
and, therefore, decrease (rather than increase) instructional effectiveness.  
 
And third, Experiment 2.3 considers the source of communications as a potential 
moderator of the dilution effect. More specifically, in line with previous work on dual 
process models—the heuristic-systematic model (Chaiken, 1980) and the elaboration 
likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986)—we suspect that irrelevant information 
may not dilute the persuasiveness of communications if the communication source is 
manifest. Especially if people are not very motivated or involved in the issue, they are 
more likely to engage in heuristic (peripheral) information processing than systematic 
(central) information processing which would involve extensive cognitive elaboration 
(Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). People tend to afford as little cognitive effort 
as possible in processing information (i.e., people are “cognitive misers”; Fiske & 
Taylor, 1991) and are therefore often inclined to base their judgments on heuristic 
cues (mental shortcuts that ease the cognitive load of making judgments) that may be 
unrelated to the specific content of communications. The identity of the source of 
communication is a heuristic cue that can come in handy in this regard (Pornpitakpan, 
2004). Indeed, recent studies have shown that people perceive and evaluate 
communications about environmental issues such as climate change and CCS 
differently depending on the communication source (Rabinovich et al., 2012; Ter Mors 
et al., 2010; Terwel et al., 2009b). We think that explicit awareness of the 
communication source may overrule the dilution effect as the identity of the source 
can function as a heuristic cue when evaluating communications about CCS.  
 
In the current research, we focus on two different sources, namely an environmental 
non-governmental organization (ENGO) and an oil and gas company. Both types of 
organizations are common sources of CCS information (Corry & Reiner, 2011) and the 
public probably has clear ideas about the branches in which these organizations 
operate. This knowledge can function as a heuristic cue that might overrule the 
dilution effect. The reason why we consider two types of sources is to make sure that 
our findings not only apply to one specific type of source. However, the presence 
versus absence of knowledge of the identity of the source should determine whether 
or not people are able to use this as a heuristic cue (independent of the specific type of 
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source). Therefore, we hypothesize that irrelevant information dilutes the 
persuasiveness of relevant information when the identity of the information source is 
not revealed, but this is less likely to be the case when the identity of the source is 
made explicit (Hypothesis 2.2).  
 
Method 
Participants and design. Hundred-forty-six undergraduate students from Leiden 
University participated in the study. They were allocated to one of six conditions of the 
2 (Information Relevance: highly relevant vs. highly relevant + irrelevant) × 3 (Source: 
no source vs. ENGO vs. oil and gas company) between-subjects factorial design. 
Participants received either €1 or course credits for their participation. Individuals who 
had participated in one of the previous experiments were not allowed to participate in 
Experiment 2.3. 
 
Procedure. Participants were seated in front of a computer screen and received some 
general background information and a brief description of CCS. Next, they received a 
message announcing a website with information about CCS. A website was chosen 
because the internet is most often used for CCS communication (Corry & Reiner, 2011) 
and it offers an excellent opportunity to implement the source manipulation. 
Participants in the ENGO condition were informed that the communication source was 
World Planet; an ENGO. In reality, however, World Planet was a fictitious organization. 
We used a fictitious organization instead of a real ENGO to prevent possible distortion 
of the results due to pre-existing perceptions about an organization (cf. Aggarwal, 
2004). Participants in the ENGO condition were then presented with a webpage 
displaying World Planet’s logo in the left upper corner. Participants in the ‘oil and gas 
company’ condition were informed that the communication source was Baptiste Oil & 
Gas, an international company in the energy sector, and they were presented with a 
webpage with the company’s logo. Participants in the ‘no source’ condition were kept 
uninformed about the identity of the communication source: They were presented 
with exactly the same webpage, but there was no logo on it.  
 
Furthermore, the information on the webpage was manipulated. Participants in the 
‘highly relevant’ condition read that CCS helps to combat global warming (see 
Experiment 2.1 for the exact description). Participants in the ‘highly relevant + 
irrelevant’ condition also read that CCS helps to combat global warming but this 
information was mixed with the same three pieces of irrelevant information as used in 
Experiments 2.1 and 2.2. In the latter condition, the highly relevant information was 
located either before, in the middle, or after the irrelevant information. This was done 
to be able to control for order effects. We did not find any order effects so we do not 
report on this matter any further. After participants had read the webpage, they 
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completed a questionnaire that included items to assess their belief that CCS has 
climate benefits, the perceived quality of the communications, attention distraction, 
and the manipulation checks. Finally, participants were debriefed, paid, and thanked 
for their participation.  
 
Measures 
Belief in the climate benefits of CCS. Belief in the climate benefits of CCS was 
measured with two items: “To what extent do you believe that CCS helps to combat 
global warming?” and “To what extent do you think that CCS would benefit the climate 
on earth?” (1 = not at all; 7 = very much), α = .74.  
 
Perceived quality of the communications. To assess the perceived quality of the 
communications, we asked participants to answer two questions: “To what extent did 
you consider the communications to be of good quality?” and “To what extent did you 
consider the communications to be coherent?” (1 = not at all; 7 = very much), α = .72.  
 
Attention distraction. Attention distraction was measured by three items: “To what 
extent were you able to keep your attention on the information?”, “To what extent 
were you able to concentrate on the content of the information?”, and ”To what 
extent did you find the information confusing?” (the first two items were reverse 
coded; 1 = not at all; 7 = very much), α = .86.  
 
Manipulation checks. We assessed the adequacy of the manipulation of the 
communications about CCS in the same way as in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2. So, again, 
all participants rated the relevance and importance of the highly relevant information 
(α = .83) and the three pieces of irrelevant information (α = .61). To check their 




Manipulation check of information relevance. As in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, paired t-
tests showed that participants perceived the highly relevant information that CCS 
helps to combat global warming as significantly more relevant (M = 5.53, SD = 1.01) 





                                                 
3
 The results also showed a small contrast effect: The relevant argument was perceived to be somewhat 
stronger when it was mixed with irrelevant information (M = 5.80, SD = 0.92) compared to when it was not 
mixed (M = 5.26, SD = 1.03), F(1, 86) = 6.32, p = .04, ηp
2
 = .07.  
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Manipulation check of communication source. We made the a priori decision to 
analyze only the data of participants who had correctly indicated which source was 
communicating. We continued running the experiment until we had an approximately 
equal number of participants with correct answers to the manipulation check in each 
of the communication source conditions. The data used for analyses were from 30 
participants in the ‘no source’ condition, 28 participants in the ENGO condition, and 34 
participants in the ‘oil and gas company’ condition. We should note that especially in 
the last condition quite a few participants gave an incorrect answer to the source 
manipulation check (N = 40). This probably has to do with the fact that the content of 
the relevant information (which was about the climate benefits of CCS) is incongruent 
with the motives oil and gas companies are assumed to act upon (e.g., de Vries, 
Terwel, Ellemers, & Daamen, in press). This might have been confusing to participants. 
However, the inclusion of these participants in the analyses did not change the pattern 
of results (see footnotes 4, 5 and 6). 
 
Comparison of ENGO and oil and gas company. We reasoned that the presence versus 
absence of a source would moderate the dilution effect regardless of the specific type 
of source. Therefore, we made the a priori decision to look at the source contrast 
(source presence vs. absence) if the two sources did not produce different results 
concerning participants’ belief in the climate benefits associated with implementing 
CCS (the main dependent variable). Accordingly, as a first step in the analysis, we 
sought to confirm that this was the case (as indicated before, we merely considered 
two types of sources to increase our confidence that the results not only apply to one 
specific source).  
 
Indeed, an ANOVA with the ‘highly relevant’ versus the ‘highly relevant + irrelevant’ 
conditions as the two levels of Information Relevance, and ENGO versus ‘oil and gas 
company’ condition as the two levels of the source factor revealed no significant 
effects (ps ≥ .29).
4
 Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 2.2. In 
subsequent analyses, we thus defined a source contrast in which the ENGO condition 
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 A similar analysis including the responses of participants with an incorrect answer to the source 
manipulation check revealed a similar pattern of results: There was neither a main effect of Information 
Relevance (p = .63), nor a main effect of Source (p = .18), nor an interaction effect (p = .73). 
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Table 2.2.  
Means (and standard deviations) for belief that CCS yields climate benefits, perceived quality of 
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Belief in the climate benefits of CCS. We performed an ANOVA with Information 
Relevance and the Source contrast (i.e., the ‘no source’ condition contrasted against 
the two source conditions) as the independent variables, and belief in the climate 
benefits of CCS as the dependent variable. The analysis did not reveal a main effect of 
Information Relevance, F(1, 86) = 0.27, p = .61, nor a main effect of the Source 
contrast, F(1, 86) = 0.48, p = .49. However, the interaction contrast effect was 




 See Table 2.2 for all means and standard 
deviations. Simple effects analysis showed that irrelevant information only diluted the 
persuasiveness of relevant information when the identity of the communication source 
was not revealed. That is, participants in the ‘no source’ condition had a stronger belief 
that CCS would yield climate benefits if highly relevant information was not mixed (M = 
5.30, SD = 0.68) than when it was mixed with irrelevant information (M = 4.33, SD = 
1.22), F(1, 88) = 4.58, p = .04, ηp
2
 = .05. However, the dilution effect did not occur if 
participants were aware about the communication source. So, these results offer 
support for Hypothesis 2.2.  
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 A similar analysis including the responses of participants with an incorrect answer to the source 
manipulation check revealed a similar pattern of results: There was neither a main effect of Information 
Relevance (p = .29), nor a main effect of the Source contrast (p = .59) but again, the interaction contrast 
effect was significant (p = .04, ηp
2
 = .03).  
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Perceived quality of the communications. We also performed an ANOVA with 
Information Relevance and the Source contrast as the independent variables, and 
perceived quality of the communications as the dependent variable. The analysis did 
not reveal a main effect of Information Relevance, F(1, 86) = 2.57, p = .11, but there 
was a main effect of the Source contrast, F(1, 86) = 3.98, p = .05, ηp
2
 = .04. The 
interaction contrast effect was not statistically significant, F(1, 86) = 2.29, p = .13.
6
 
Simple effects analysis revealed that irrelevant information diluted the perceived 
quality of relevant information only when the identity of the communication source 
was not made explicit. Participants in the ‘no source’ condition perceived 
communications consisting of a mix of highly relevant and irrelevant information to be 
of significantly lower quality (M = 3.83, SD = 1.28) than the communications consisting 
of only the highly relevant information (M = 4.83, SD = 1.51), F(1, 88) = 4.65, p = .03, 
ηp
2
 = .05. Information relevance did not affect perceptions of the quality of the 
communications when the source was made explicit. See Table 2.2 for means and 
standard deviations. 
 
Attention distraction. An ANOVA with Information Relevance and the Source contrast 
as the independent variables and attention distraction as the dependent variable 
revealed no significant effects (Fs < 1, ps ≥ .39), indicating that the dilution effect was 
not due to attention distraction. 
 
Mediation 
We used Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) bootstrap approach to test whether perceived 
quality of the communications mediated the dilution effect observed in the ‘no source’ 
condition. Bootstrapping uses resampling of raw data to estimate the confidence 
interval (CI) of the indirect effect. We used 5000 resamples (bias corrected) and 
obtained a 95% confidence interval that did not include zero (lower CI = −1.00; upper 
CI = −0.03), indica_ng that the indirect effect was significant. This finding is consistent 








                                                 
6
 A similar analysis including the responses of participants with an incorrect answer to the source 
manipulation check revealed a similar pattern of results but the main effect of Information Relevance was 
significant (p = .02, ηp
2
 = .04) and there was no main effect of the Source contrast (p = .12). Again, the 
interaction contrast effect was not significant (p = .18).  
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General Discussion 
The implementation of CO2 capture and storage (CCS) is considered worldwide as a 
viable strategy to mitigate climate change. Considering that members of the general 
public seem to know little or nothing about the technology, there is plenty of room for 
both proponents and opponents to inform people about the issue, and to convince 
them of the advantages or the disadvantages of CCS. The current research highlights 
the need to think carefully about the content of public communications. Based on 
insights from previous research on the dilution of judgments and beliefs due to the 
presence of irrelevant information (e.g., Meyvis & Janiszewski, 2002; Nisbett et al., 
1981), we hypothesized that adding irrelevant (i.e., nondiagnostic) information to 
highly relevant information would lower the persuasiveness of communications about 
CCS. The results supported this prediction. Importantly, we showed that irrelevant 
information not only diluted evaluations of the persuasiveness of communications 
(Experiments 2.1 and 2.2), but also actual beliefs about the issue under consideration 
(Experiment 2.3). Furthermore, the results showed that the dilution effect was 
eliminated when the information source was made explicit.  
 
Irrelevant information weakened the impact of positive (pro-CCS) as well as negative 
(con-CCS) information, but the effect was less pronounced for negative information. A 
possible explanation for this finding might lie in the fact that negative information is 
typically processed relatively thoroughly—that is, more thoroughly than positive 
information (cf. Baumeister et al., 2001). Accordingly, people are more likely to isolate 
and focus on a relevant argument against CCS (as compared to a relevant argument for 
CCS) that is accompanied by irrelevant information. As a result, people’s judgments 
will be based primarily on the relevant negative argument and the accompanying 
irrelevant information is less likely to bias their judgments. This might explain why the 
dilution effect was relatively weak when irrelevant details were added to relevant 
negative (con-CCS) information and relatively strong when irrelevant details were 
added to relevant positive (pro-CCS) information.  
 
The current research also sheds some light on the psychological process associated 
with the dilution effect on persuasiveness of communications. Irrelevant details 
impaired the perceived quality of communications when they were added to a 
relevant argument (i.e., that CCS helps to combat global warming) and this rather than 
attention distraction guided the dilution effect in Experiment 2.3. We assume the same 
process accounts for the dilution effect on judged persuasiveness (as in Experiments 
2.1 and 2.2), although we acknowledge that different psychological processes are 
associated with different types of judgments. For instance, dilution in judgments about 
persons may be caused by the use of the representativeness heuristic (Kahneman & 
Tversky 1972): Non-stereotypical information can weaken stereotypical judgments 
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about a person because it reduces the similarity between a person and a stereotype 
(Nisbett et al., 1981). Evaluations of products may be diluted due to other processes 
though, such as due to what Meyvis and Janiszewski (2002) referred to as biased 
hypothesis testing, a process in which people selectively search for information that 
supports a prior hypothesis about a product. We think that such processes do not 
apply here. That is, unlike this previous research, participants in our experiments were 
not instructed before the presentation of the information that they had to make a 
judgment later, and only few may have had clear ideas about the topic prior to 
participating in the study. This is why biased hypothesis testing is unlikely to explain 
the dilution effect in our research. Instead, we propose that adding irrelevant details 
to relevant information impairs the quality of communications and that this causes the 
dilution effect on both perceived and “actual” persuasiveness (i.e., beliefs). 
Nevertheless, further research is needed to examine the psychological processes that 
underlie the dilution effect in public communications in more detail. 
 
The current research has further identified an important boundary condition for the 
dilution effect. We found that adding moderately relevant information did not reduce 
the persuasiveness of communications. This finding is consistent with Tetlock and 
Boettger (1989) whose research also suggests that a dilution effect does not occur 
when moderately relevant information is added to highly relevant information. Our 
results differ from those of Meyvis and Janiszewski (2002) though. They found that 
moderately relevant information (which they referred to as “less supporting” 
information) strengthened the impact of relevant information. In their study, 
participants had to predict whether or not a computer was fast, and the information 
that was intended to be less supportive stated that the computer has 64 megabyte of 
working memory and a 32-speed CD-ROM. However, this information could have been 
interpreted as very relevant for computer speed, causing polarization instead of 
dilution. In the present study, we made sure to pilot test the relevance of the different 
pieces of information. All in all, based on the current results, we believe that adding 
information to a key message is not necessarily harmful for the persuasiveness of the 
message, as long as the additional information is not totally irrelevant. However, 
increasing the length of communications by aggregating information will also not 
benefit persuasiveness unless the additional information is really relevant.  
 
We have considered the dilution effect in the context of communications about CCS, 
which raises the question of whether the results also apply to other environmental 
issues. We believe this is the case, considering that the dilution effect has already been 
shown to play a role across a wide range of different settings. However, we do think 
that the dilution effect in public communications might be stronger with respect to 
complex and novel issues (CCS, nanotechnology, and genetically modified foods, to 
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name a few) than for more familiar issues about which people have already formed a 
stable opinion. After all, communications about a well-known issue are less likely to 
change deep-rooted existing beliefs, regardless of the perceived quality of such 
communications. Moreover, people who have a strong opinion about an issue may 
focus on specific aspects of communications rather than that they look at all the 
information (i.e., selective exposure). For instance, they may select and pay attention 
to arguments that support their own views and ignore other information (e.g., Hart et 
al., 2009; Smith et al., 2008). Nevertheless, the dilution effect in public 
communications is most important to consider in the context of emerging 
environmental issues since the need to inform (and the possibility to convince) the 
public is clearest in such contexts.  
 
Furthermore, the fact that we have used samples of undergraduate students to test 
our predictions raises the question of whether the results generalize to the general 
public. In this regard, it is important to realize that during their education, students are 
required and trained to discriminate between main issues and side issues. Accordingly, 
students are expected to be better able than less highly educated people to isolate the 
most relevant information and to base their judgments primarily on this information, 
even if their knowledge about the topic is limited. This is important because the skill to 
discriminate between relevant and irrelevant information may have implications for 
the magnitude of the dilution effect. Indeed, research shows that expert auditors are 
better able than non-experts to isolate and focus on the most relevant information 
when they are asked to judge account-related information (Ettenson et al., 1987), 
although they are not completely insensitive to irrelevant information (Waller & 
Zimbelman, 2003). In light of these findings, we believe that the use of undergraduate 
students provides a relatively conservative test of our hypotheses so that the dilution 
effect is probably stronger, rather than weaker, among members of the general public. 
We do not claim that our results apply to all possible populations, however. For 
instance, it remains to be seen whether the dilution effect also occurs among people 
for whom the issue of CCS is new, but directly personally relevant (e.g., people who are 
informed about plans for a CCS project in their own residential area). Perhaps the 
dilution effect impedes the effectiveness of “onsite” communications, but it might also 
be the case that increased personal relevance reduces the magnitude of the dilution 
effect. Future research is needed to examine this issue.  
 
The findings of our research may be used by both the opponents and the proponents 
of CCS to increase the effectiveness of their communications. Sometimes organizations 
use the “scattergun approach” to public information-sharing, which is characterized by 
firing lots of information in the hope that people feel completely informed and will be 
persuaded by one of the pieces of information that sticks to them. We argue that it is 
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more effective to spare the details and share only the most relevant arguments to 
explain the organizational position than to use the scattergun approach. Not only 
irrelevant details should be spared, moderately relevant information should be used 
sparingly as well. That is, moderately relevant information does not seem beneficial for 
the persuasiveness of communications and, if perceived as irrelevant by the public, can 




Another concrete practical suggestion for organizations involved in CCS would be to 
make the organizational identity explicit, for instance by printing the name and logo of 
the organization on leaflets and other informational materials. After all, our findings 
show that awareness of the information source makes communications less sensitive 
to the dilution effect. We want to stress that revealing one’s identity certainly not 
guarantees the elimination of the dilution effect though. Only those people with clear 
ideas about the organization (or at least about the branch in which it operates) are 
likely to use the identity of the organization as a heuristic cue when confronted with 
information. Moreover, people will not necessarily take note of the organization’s 
name or logo. Therefore, we still advise organizations to determine the relevance of 
the variety of CCS information before they start communicating. This might be costly 
and time consuming, but could be worth the effort because only then can details be 
spared and the relevance be shared. 
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 Of course there are several possibilities for strategic use of our findings. For example, opponents may 
decide to acknowledge the climate benefits associated with the implementation of CCS but at the same time 




Pitfalls in the Use of Emphasis Framing 
 
This chapter is based on: de Vries, G., Terwel, B. W., & Ellemers, N. (under review). Perceptions of 
manipulation and judgments of illegitimacy: Pitfalls in the use of emphasis framing when communicating 
about CO2 capture and storage. 
 
 
One of the greatest environmental challenges the world is facing today is combating 
global warming. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
warming of the climate system is unequivocal (IPCC, 2013). This change in climate has 
potentially harmful consequences for humankind and nature, including disturbance of 
ecosystems, extinction of some plant and animal species, and a rising sea level. Global 
warming is largely due to growing emissions of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide 
(CO2). Emissions of CO2 partially result from natural-induced processes; however, 
human-induced CO2 emissions are regarded as the most important contributors to 
global warming (IPCC, 2013; WMO, 2013). A well-known example is the CO2 release 
from the combustion of fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and natural gas to produce energy 
and electricity. To combat global warming, many industrialized countries have agreed 
to reduce their emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases (United Nations, 1998; 
2012). One of the measures to reduce CO2 emissions is the large-scale implementation 
of CO2 capture and storage (CCS) (IPCC, 2007). In a nutshell, CCS involves the capture 
of CO2 in fossil fuel power plants or other major industrial processes, and the 
subsequent transport and long-term storage of this CO2 in deep geological formations 
such as depleted natural gas fields and saline aquifers.  
 
Besides technical and regulatory issues, the viability of CCS is codetermined by 
whether or not members of the public accept its use. For example, a proposed CCS 
demonstration project in the Dutch town of Barendrecht has been cancelled in 2010 
because of local opposition to this project (Terwel et al., 2012). This opposition could 
be partly due to communication issues, for example, information from the project 
partners was not always perceived as relevant and trustworthy (Brunsting et al., 2011). 
In contrast, a local activist group called ‘CO2isNee’ (i.e., CO2isNo) argued very fiercely 
against the demonstration project through publications on its website, messages in 
local newspapers, and public meetings (Brunsting et al., 2011; Terwel et al., 2012).  
 
Research supports the potential influence of communication on public attitudes 
towards controversial, novel technologies. For example, the public opinion about 
nanotechnology can be influenced by the extent to which risks and benefits of the 
technology are described (Cobb, 2005). Similarly, attitudes towards nuclear power can 
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be affected when this energy resource is related to climate change mitigation (Jones et 
al., 2012).  
 
More than not, public communications about novel technologies are persuasive 
instead of informative; they are to create, reinforce, modify or extinguish the beliefs, 
attitudes, intentions, motivations, and/or behaviors of an audience (e.g., Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975; Gass & Seiter, 2007; Hovland et al., 1953). Scientists as well as 
practitioners tend to focus on the effectiveness of persuasive communication, for 
instance regarding its influence on people’s attitude. However, less scientific attention 
goes to how recipients perceive persuasive communications. Because the 
psychological effects are rather neglected, some persuasive communication 
techniques might appear to be effective on the short run while people’s (presumably 
negative) perceptions about their use stay undetected. Yet, these perceptions are 
important because they can have long-term costs. In the current research, we aim to 
examine whether or not persuasive communication can lead to unforeseen, 
unfavorable perceptions about the message and the communication source (i.e., 
pitfalls). More specifically, we aim to identify potential pitfalls in the use of emphasis 
framing when communicating about CCS.  
 
Emphasis Framing 
Emphasis framing is a persuasion technique in which greater weight is given to one 
aspect of an issue over another aspect (e.g., Chong & Druckman, 2007). Emphasis 
framing has shown to be effective regarding shaping people’s attitudes. For example, 
information that genetically modified food helps to combat world hunger moves 
attitudes towards the food into a more positive position than information that 
genetically modified food impacts on biodiversity and the food chain (Druckman & 
Bolsen, 2011). This example—where only a single proposition is communicated and 
any opposing considerations are omitted—illustrates a strong form of emphasis 
framing: one-sided framing. A more subtle form is two-sided framing. Two-sided 
framing involves the communication of two competing frames with an emphasis on 
one of them. Two-sided framing can also be an effective technique to shape people’s 
attitudes towards an issue. For example, people indicated more tolerance towards the 
Ku Klux Klan after reading a news article that characterized a planned rally of this 
organization both as an act of freedom of speech and as a risk to public safety, but 
emphasized the aspect of freedom of speech, than when the article emphasized public 
safety (e.g., Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997).
8
  
                                                 
8
 Another well-known type of framing—that will not be addressed in the current research—is equivalency 
framing. This type of framing refers to ways in which logically equivalent alternative phrases (e.g., “75% fat 
free” versus “25% fat”) can lead to different attitudes and/or decisions (e.g., Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 
1998; Tversky, & Kahneman, 1981). 
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Perceived Manipulation 
Although emphasis framing can be effective in shaping attitudes, a potential pitfall in 
the use of this technique is that it can be perceived as manipulative. That is, people are 
regularly confronted with a variety of messages and are usually able to distinguish 
persuasion attempts from informative communications (e.g., Campbell & Kirmani, 
2000; Friestad & Wright, 1994). When confronted with communications that 
emphasize one aspect over another, people may perceive being manipulated into 
supporting (or opposing) an issue. Such perceptions of manipulation likely elicit 
negative evaluations of the communications and the communication source (see 
Campbell, 1995; Friestad & Wright, 1994). Emphasis framing could even backfire in a 
sense that people may react against the advocated position if they perceive 
manipulation and feel that their freedom to make up their own mind is threatened. 
They might even adopt the opposite position in order to try to regain control over their 
own opinion (i.e., psychological reactance; e.g., Brehm & Brehm, 1981). This backfire 
effect is also identified in research that found that people became more negative 
about CCS when they placed little trust in the integrity of organizations that supported 
the implementation of the technology (Terwel et al., 2009a).  
 
In short, perceived manipulation is a potential pitfall in the use of emphasis framing. In 
this paper, we will test the prediction that people perceive more manipulation when 
they read a news article about CCS that emphasizes advantages over disadvantages (or 




Perceptions of manipulation in communications could depend on the communication 
source. That is, recent studies have shown that people perceive and evaluate 
communications about environmental issues such as climate change and CCS 
differently depending on the communication source (e.g., Rabinovich et al., 2012; Ter 
Mors et al., 2010; Terwel et al., 2009b). Dual process models such as the heuristic-
systematic model (HSM; Chaiken, 1980) and the elaboration likelihood model (ELM; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) can explain this dependence. According to these models, 
recipients process information in a more or less systematic (central) and heuristic 
(peripheral) way. Systematic processing means that people scrutinize all available 
information and are persuaded especially by message characteristics (i.e., the 
content). If people process information heuristically, they are persuaded especially by 
cues that are unrelated to the message, such as source characteristics. People are 
inclined to process information heuristically because they are “cognitive misers”; they 
tend to afford as little cognitive effort as possible (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). People will 
particularly follow a more heuristic route when they are not very motivated, involved 
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or able to process information. This is the case, for instance, when the issue does not 
interest them much (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  
 
Accordingly, people could easily process communications about CCS heuristically if 
they are not very interested in this difficult, novel issue. As a result, source 
characteristics might function as a cue that affects how these communications are 
perceived. For example, regardless of whether an article about CCS is balanced or 
biased, it will probably be perceived as more manipulative when it is produced by an 
oil and gas company that supports the implementation of the technology, than when it 
is produced by a news agency that supposedly provides objective information. In the 
current research, we will test whether communications from oil and gas companies are 
generally perceived as more manipulative than communications from press agencies 
(Hypothesis 3.2).  
 
Legitimacy Judgments 
Although it is likely that people perceive biased communications as relatively 
manipulative, the application of emphasis framing might not be necessarily judged as 
inappropriate. We predict that the perceptions of manipulation caused by emphasis 
framing primarily lead to judgments of illegitimacy when people have good reason to 
expect balanced information. This is for example the case when the information comes 
from a news agency or another source that is supposed to be impartial. Indeed, 
objectivity is a fundamental requirement for journalists (Ryan, 2001). However, 
objectivity is not the norm for sources that are economically involved in an issue, such 
as oil and gas companies that invest in the development of CCS. People have become 
accustomed to the fact that—in order to try to gain the favors of the public—
organizations with a specific interest in an issue use persuasive communication, 
instead of informative communication (Campbell, 1995; Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; 
Friestad & Wright, 1994). As a result, biased messages from these organizations are 
probably not judged as less legitimate than balanced messages.  
 
Accordingly, we will test two predictions. The first is the prediction that for news 
agencies, the use of emphasis framing in communications about CCS is considered as 
less legitimate than the provision of balanced information. However, this does not hold 
true for oil and gas companies involved in the development of CCS (Hypothesis 3.3). 
The second prediction is that the relation between perceived manipulation and 
legitimacy judgments is stronger when people evaluate communications about CCS 
from news agencies than when they evaluate communications from oil and gas 
companies (Hypothesis 3.4). 
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The Current Research 
We examine support for our hypotheses in two experiments. Experiment 3.1 tests the 
hypothesis that people perceive more manipulation when they read a news article that 
emphasizes advantages of CCS over disadvantages (or vice versa) compared to when 
they read a balanced article (Hypothesis 3.1). Both one-sided and two-sided frames are 
considered in this experiment. Furthermore, Experiment 3.1 aims to replicate the 
finding from prior research in examining the effectiveness of emphasis framing 
regarding shaping attitudes towards CCS. Experiment 3.2 examines the combined 
effects of emphasis framing and communication source on perceived manipulation and 
legitimacy judgments (all four hypotheses). The experiment focuses on differences 
between (positively) biased and balanced information, either from a news agency or 





Participants and design. Participants were 120 undergraduate students from Leiden 
University (20 male and 99 female [1 unspecified]; Mage = 19.83, SD = 3.91). Sixty-three 
participants had heard about CCS prior to participating in the experiment, while 57 
participants had not. Awareness of CCS did not moderate the results reported here 
and will not be discussed any further. Participants were randomly allocated to either 
one of five experimental conditions (Communication: one-sided pro CCS vs. two-sided 
pro CCS vs. balanced vs. two-sided con CCS vs. one-sided con CCS). Participants 
received either €1.50 or course credits for their voluntary participation.  
 
Procedure. The experiment consisted of two parts. First, participants were requested 
to indicate their gender and age, and to answer some general questions.
9
 Among these 
questions were items assessing how important participants considered a number of 
environmental topics to be. Two of these topics—combating global warming and the 
quality of groundwater—were of primary interest because these topics were 
addressed in our communication manipulation and we wanted to be able to confirm 
that they were judged as relevant. The remaining environmental topics were filler 
items concerning genetically modified food, air pollution, and deforestation. After 
participants had completed this first part of the experiment, they were presented with 
a fictitious news article about CCS (e.g., the stimulus material). When they had read 
the article, participants completed another questionnaire, which included items to 
measure attitudes towards CCS, perceived manipulation, awareness of CCS, and 
                                                 
9
 We do not report all measures in this paper for reasons of clarity and conciseness. Measures and results 
are available on request.  
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perceived emphasis of the article (i.e., the manipulation check). Finally, participants 
were debriefed, paid, and thanked for their participation.  
 
Stimulus materials. We tailored the appearance of the article after true newspaper 
copy, following previous experimental research on emphasis framing (e.g., Druckman, 
2001). The article was allegedly written by the Dutch national news agency ANP and 
displayed the logo of the agency in the upper left corner. In the opening paragraph, all 
articles provided the same general background information about CO2 and CCS. The 
differences between the articles were in the headline and following paragraphs. The 
one-sided articles addressed either the positive consequences of CCS for the climate 
(stating that CCS helps to combat global warming by reducing CO2 emissions) or the 
negative consequences for the quality of groundwater (stating the risk of acidification 
should CO2 leak from the storage reservoir) without mentioning any opposing 
information. The two-sided articles addressed both the advantage and disadvantage 
but emphasis was placed on one of them (cf. Druckman, 2001). The balanced article 
gave equal weight to advantages and disadvantages. See Appendix B for an exact 
description of all five articles.  
 
Measures 
Relevance of arguments. To assess whether or not the advantage and the 
disadvantage mentioned in the articles were related to environmental topics that 
participants considered relevant prior to reading the article, we asked: “To what extent 
do you find it important to combat global warming?”, and “To what extent is quality of 
the groundwater important to you?” (1 = not at all; 7 = very much).  
 
Perceived emphasis. We measured perceived emphasis (i.e., the manipulation check) 
within the article with two items: “To what extent did you feel that the emphasis in the 
article was on the advantages of CCS?”, and “To what extent did you feel that the 
emphasis in the article was on the disadvantages of CCS?” (1 = not at all; 7 = very 
much).  
 
Perceived manipulation. We measured perceived manipulation with four items: “To 
what extent did you think that information was kept from you?”, “To what extent did 
you think that you heard only one side of the story?”, “To what extent did you perceive 
the information to be biased?”, and “To what extent did you perceive the article as 
partial?” (1 = not at all; 7 = very much), α = .82. The responses to these items were 
averaged into a single index of perceived manipulation. 
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Attitude towards CCS. We assessed participants’ attitude towards CCS with four 9-
point semantic differential scales (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1984): ”I find CCS [bad–good, 
harmful–beneficial, foolish–wise, unfavorable–favorable]”, α = .91.  
 
Results 
Relevance of arguments. Participants considered both environmental topics relevant. 
Ratings of relevance of ground water quality were significantly higher than the 
midpoint of the 7-point scale, t(118) = 22.27, p < .001 (M = 6.09, SD = 1.03). Ratings of 
the relevance of combating global warming showed a similar effect, t(118) = 9.13, p < 




Perceived emphasis. We performed a repeated measures ANOVA with Perceived 
Emphasis (Advantages vs. Disadvantages) as the within-subjects factor and the five 
communication conditions as the between-subjects factor to check the adequacy of 
the communication manipulation. The results showed the anticipated Communication 
× Perceived Emphasis interaction, F(4, 115) = 48.23, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .63. As intended, 
participants in the pro conditions (one-sided and two-sided) perceived more emphasis 
on advantages than on disadvantages (ps < .001). In contrast, participants in the con 
conditions (one-sided and two-sided) perceived more emphasis on disadvantages than 
on advantages (ps = .001). Interestingly, participants in the balanced condition also 
perceived more emphasis on advantages than on disadvantages (p < .001). See Table 
3.1 for means and standard deviations. 
 
Table 3.1.  
Means (and standard deviations) for perceived emphasis on advantages and disadvantages as a 



















































                                                 
10
 One person did not answer these questions. 
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Perceived manipulation. We predicted that the use of emphasis framing would evoke 
higher levels of perceived manipulation compared to the provision of balanced 
information (Hypothesis 3.1). An ANOVA with Communication as the independent 
variable and perceived manipulation as the dependent variable revealed a significant 
effect, F(4, 115) = 5.44, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .16. Bonferroni post hoc analyses confirmed that 
participants perceived the article as significantly more manipulative when emphasis 
framing was applied (i.e., the one-sided and two-sided pro and con conditions) than 
when the article was balanced (ps ≤ .01). The level of perceived manipulation did not 
differ between the four emphasis-frame conditions (ps ≥ 1.00). See Table 3.2 for 
means and standard deviations.  
 
Table 3.2.  
Means (and standard deviations) for perceived manipulation and attitude towards CCS as a 















































Note: Attitude towards CCS was measured on a 9-point scale. Perceived manipulation was 
measured on a 7-point scale. 
 
Attitude towards CCS. We performed an ANOVA with Communication as the 
independent variable and attitude towards CCS as the dependent variable to examine 
the extent to which emphasis framing influenced attitude. The analysis revealed a 
significant effect, F(4, 115) = 3.15, p = .02, ηp
2
 = .10. Bonferroni post hoc analyses 
showed that people in the ‘one-sided pro’ condition had a more positive attitude 
towards CCS (M = 6.25, SD = 1.60) than people in the ‘two-sided con’ condition (M = 
4.55, SD = 1.88), p = .02. Further differences between conditions were not significant 





Experiment 3.1 revealed the hypothesized effect of emphasis framing on perceived 
manipulation (Hypothesis 3.1). Participants perceived the biased news articles about 
CCS as more manipulative than the balanced article. Furthermore, Experiment 3.1 
replicated—to some extent—the finding from previous research that emphasis 
                                                 
11
 In comparison, the survey shows that the general attitude towards CCS is just above the midpoint of a (7-
point) scale (M = 4.49, SD = 1.45), t(844) = 9.76, p < .001. See Appendix A.  
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framing can affect attitudes. Participants who read that CCS can help combat global 
warming (without reading about risks for the quality of the ground water) were more 
positive towards the technology than participants who read that although CCS has 
positive and negative consequences, the possible risks for the ground water outweigh 
the advantages for the climate. 
 
Participants in the balanced condition perceived more emphasis on advantages than 
on disadvantages and evaluated CCS as relatively positive. Although this effect was 
unanticipated (the effects of two competing frames with equal weight are expected to 
cancel out each other, Druckman, Peterson, & Slothuus, 2013), it did not interact with 
the predicted effects on perceived manipulation. As predicted, the balanced article 
was perceived as significantly less manipulative than the biased articles. The perceived 
emphasis on advantages and the more positive attitude might be explained by the fact 
that in the balanced article, the advantage was mentioned before the disadvantage. 
Information that is mentioned first can make a stronger impression than information 
that follows, it can be better remembered and can have more influence (i.e., primacy 
effect; e.g., Asch, 1952; Crowley & Hoyer, 1994). We will examine the possibility of a 
primacy effect in Experiment 3.2. 
 
Experiment 3.2 
Experiment 3.2 aimed to replicate the main finding of Experiment 3.1 that biased CCS 
communications are perceived as more manipulative than balanced communications 
(Hypothesis 3.1). Experiment 3.2 extends the previous experiment by also comparing 
different sources. More specifically, we test the hypothesis that communications from 
oil and gas companies are generally perceived as more manipulative than 
communications from press agencies (Hypothesis 3.2). Furthermore, we examine 
whether the use of emphasis framing in communications about CCS is judged as less 
legitimate than providing balanced information in the case of news agencies, but not 
for oil and gas companies (Hypothesis 3.3). Finally, Experiment 3.2 tests the prediction 
that perceptions of manipulation and judgments of legitimacy are stronger related 
when a news agency communicates about CCS than when an oil and gas company is 
the source (Hypothesis 3.4). 
 
The basic assumption underlying our predictions is that, in general, news agencies are 
expected to be less manipulative than oil and gas companies. To check whether or not 
this assumption is correct, we assess expectations of manipulation prior to the 
presentation of the stimulus materials in Experiment 3.2. As an additional check, 
Experiment 3.2 includes two versions of the balanced article to counterbalance the 
order in which the advantage and disadvantage of CCS are presented. This allows us to 
check whether a primacy effect might explain why participants in the balanced 
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condition in Experiment 3.1 perceived more emphasis on advantages than on 
disadvantages. Whereas Experiment 3.1 revealed that pro and con articles were 
considered equally manipulative (regardless of their strength), we selected the (two-
sided) pro CCS article for use in Experiment 3.2. We chose this particular article in 
order to secure the credibility of the communications. After all, it is more likely that an 
oil and gas company that is involved in CCS emphasizes the benefits associated with 
the technology rather than the risks. 
 
Method 
Participants and design. Participants were 139 undergraduate students from Leiden 
University (32 male, 106 female [1 unspecified], Mage = 20.05, SD = 2.82). Eighty-one 
participants had heard about CCS prior to participation, 58 participants had not. Again, 
awareness of CCS did not moderate the results reported here and will not be discussed 
any further. Participants were randomly allocated to one of the six experimental 
conditions in this 2 (Source: news agency vs. oil and gas company) × 3 
(Communication: two-sided pro CCS vs. balanced advantage-first vs. balanced 
disadvantage-first)
 
between-subjects design. Participants received either €1 or course 
credits for their voluntary participation. Individuals who had participated in 
Experiment 3.1 were not allowed to participate in Experiment 3.2. 
 
Procedure. The procedure and stimulus materials were largely similar to those of 
Experiment 3.1 (see Appendix B). Participants in the ‘two-sided pro CCS’ condition read 
the same article as participants in this condition in Experiment 3.1. Participants in the 
‘balanced advantage-first’ condition read the same article as participants in the 
balanced condition in Experiment 3.1. Participants in the ‘balanced disadvantage-first’ 
condition read a similar article, but here the disadvantage preceded the advantage. 
Importantly, depending on experimental condition, the article allegedly had been 
written by an independent news agency (as in Experiment 3.1) or an unspecified oil 
and gas company that invests in CCS. Upon completion of the experiment, participants 
were debriefed, paid, and thanked for their participation.  
 
Measures 
We used the same items as in Experiment 3.1 to measure perceived relevance of the 
arguments, perceived emphasis on (dis)advantages within the article, and perceived 
manipulation (α = .86). 
 
Expected manipulation. We assessed the extent to which participants expected 
manipulation from news agencies and oil and gas companies by means of five 
questions per source, asked prior to presentation of the article. The items read: “To 
what extent do you think that [news agencies/oil and gas companies] try to influence 
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the public opinion?”, “To what extent do you think that [news agencies/oil and gas 
companies] try to manipulate people by means of communication?”, “To what extent 
do you think that [news agencies/oil and gas companies] try to convince people of 
their own viewpoints?”, “To what extent do you think that information from [news 
agencies/oil and gas companies] is objective?”, and “To what extent do you think that 
information from [news agencies/oil and gas companies] is honest?” (1 = not at all; 7 = 
very much; last 2 items reversed). The responses to these items were averaged into a 
single index of expected manipulation from oil and gas companies (α = .89) and 
expected manipulation from news agencies (α = .89). 
 
Legitimacy judgments. Participants’ judgments of the legitimacy of the 
communications were assessed by means of four 9-point semantic differential scales. 
Participants were requested to respond to the phrase ”I consider the manner in which 
the article describes the issue of CCS [illegitimate–legitimate, unacceptable–
acceptable, inappropriate–appropriate, not suitable–suitable]”, α = .93. Responses 
were averaged to form a single index of legitimacy judgments.  
 
Principal component analysis with Varimax rotation revealed that legitimacy 
judgments and perceived manipulation represented different constructs. The items 
loaded on two separate components with no substantial cross loadings (all cross 
loadings ≤ -.18) explaining a total variance of 76.22% in the individual items. The 
eigenvalue of the first component (legitimacy judgments) was 4.93; the eigenvalue of 
the second component (perceived manipulation) was 1.17. 
 
Results 
Relevance of arguments. As in Experiment 3.1, participants considered both 
environmental topics relevant. Ratings of relevance of ground water quality were 
significantly higher than the midpoint of the 7-point scale (t[137] = 18.30, p < .001 [M = 
5.78, SD = 1.14]), as were ratings of the relevance of combating global warming, (t[137] 




Expected manipulation. As anticipated, participants expected news agencies to be 
significantly less manipulative (M = 4.25, SD = 1.12) than oil and gas companies (M = 





                                                 
12
 One person did not answer these questions. 
 
13
 The survey data indicate that this expectation about manipulation by oil and gas companies is in line with 
general expectations (M = 5.21, SD = 1.15). See Appendix A.  
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Perceived emphasis. A repeated measures ANOVA with Perceived Emphasis as the 
within-subjects factor and Communication as the between-subject factors showed a 
significant interaction-effect, F(2, 136) = 17.29, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .20. As in Experiment 
3.1, participants in the ‘two-sided pro CCS’ and balanced conditions perceived more 
emphasis on advantages in the article than on disadvantages. However, this perceived 
imbalance was clearest in the pro condition. More specifically, within this condition, 
we found the largest difference between perceived emphasis on advantages (M = 5.67, 
SD = 1.21) versus disadvantages (M = 2.74, SD = 1.20), F(1,45) = 85.39, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 
.66. Participants in the two balanced conditions also perceived more emphasis on 
advantages than on disadvantages. However, these differences were less pronounced 
than in the ‘two-sided pro CCS’ condition. Importantly, the difference did not only 
occur in the ‘balanced advantage-first’ condition (Madvantages = 4.51, SD = 1.52, 
Mdisadvantages = 3.26, SD = 1.21, F[1,46] = 27.71, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .38), but also in the 
‘balanced disadvantage-first’ condition (Madvantages = 3.80, SD = 1.54, Mdisadvantages = 3.17, 




Thus, the order in which the arguments 
had been provided cannot explain the perceived emphasis on advantages over 
disadvantages. Therefore, we do not differentiate between the two balanced 





Perceived manipulation. To test Hypothesis 3.1 and 3.2, we performed an ANOVA 
with the Communication contrast (pro condition vs. the two balanced conditions) and 
Source as the independent variables, and perceived manipulation as the dependent 
variable. In support of Hypothesis 3.1, this analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
the Communication contrast, F(1, 133) = 25.58, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .16. Participants in the 
‘two-sided pro CCS’ condition perceived the article as more manipulative (M = 4.76, SD 
= 1.36) than participants in the balanced conditions (Madv-first = 3.91, SD = 1.33, Mdisadv-
first = 3.32, SD = 1.21). Furthermore, we found the predicted main effect of Source 
(Hypothesis 3.2). Participants perceived the article as more manipulative when it was 
produced by an oil and gas company (M = 4.31, SD = 1.32) than when it was produced 
by a news agency (M = 3.68, SD = 1.46), F(1, 133) = 8.63, p = .004, ηp
2
 = .06. There was 
no interaction effect, F(1, 133) = 0.99, p = .32, indicating that the effect of the type of 
communication (biased vs. balanced) on perceived manipulation was not moderated 
by the identity of the source. See Table 3.3 for all means and standard deviations. 
 
Legitimacy judgments. We predicted that for news agencies, providing biased 
information is considered as less legitimate than providing balanced information, but 
for oil and gas companies, this does not hold true (Hypothesis 3.3). To test this 
prediction, we performed an ANOVA with the Communication contrast and Source as 
the independent variables, and legitimacy judgments as the dependent variable. The 
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analysis revealed a main effect of the Communication contrast, F(1, 133) = 13.26, p < 
.001, ηp
2
 = .09, a main effect of Source, F(1, 133) = 4.19, p = .04, ηp
2
 = .03, and the 
hypothesized interaction effect, F(1, 133) = 4.33, p = .04, ηp
2
 = .03. Participants in the 
‘news agency’ condition judged the biased article as less legitimate than the balanced 
articles, whereas such a difference was not observed in the ‘oil and gas company’ 
condition. These results offer support for Hypothesis 3.3. See Table 3.3 for all means 
and standard deviations. 
 
Table 3.3.  
Means (and standard deviations) for perceived manipulation, legitimacy judgments and attitude 





































































Note: Attitude towards CCS and legitimacy judgments were measured on 9-point scales. 
Perceived manipulation was measured on a 7-point scale. 
 
Furthermore, we predicted that the relation between perceived manipulation and 
legitimacy judgments is stronger when people evaluate communications from news 
agencies than when they evaluate communications from oil and gas companies 
(Hypothesis 3.4). Consistent with this hypothesis, we found that the more 
manipulative a news agency’s article was perceived, the less legitimate it was judged (r 
= -.74, p < .001). This correlation was less strong when the article came from an oil and 
gas company (r = -.47, p < .001). Fisher’s Z test confirmed that the difference between 




                                                 
14
 The effect of pro CCS communication on attitude could not be compared with the effect of communication 
against CCS because the design did not include a con condition. However, in order to be consistent, we 
assessed participants’ attitude towards CCS with the same semantic differential scales as in Experiment 3.1, 
α = .86. An ANOVA with the Communication contrast and Source as the independent variables, and attitude 
towards CCS as the dependent variable revealed no statistically significant effects (ps ≥ .26). 
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Mediation 
Furthermore, we performed a bootstrap analysis that allows for the inclusion of 
contrast coding (Hayes & Preacher, in press) to test whether the effect of emphasis 
framing on legitimacy judgments in the ‘news agency’ condition was mediated by 
perceived manipulation. This approach uses resampling of raw data to estimate the 
confidence interval (CI) of the indirect effect. We used 10000 resamples (bias 
corrected) and obtained a 95% confidence interval that did not include zero (lower CI = 
0.36; upper CI = 1.41), indicating the proposed indirect effect.  
 
General Discussion 
The implementation of CO2 capture and storage technology (CCS) is considered a 
useful measure to achieve significant CO2 emission reductions in the short run. People 
form opinions about the technology based on informative and persuasive 
communications. Informative communications provide unbiased information about an 
issue and pay attention to relevant aspects without pushing people into one direction 
over another. This allows people to form their own informed opinion. Persuasive 
communications also provide information; however, in these types of 
communications, information is often framed in a way that a specific position is 
advanced over another in order to nudge people into that position. This is referred to 
as emphasis framing (e.g., Chong & Druckman, 2007). 
 
This research contributes to literature by revealing potential pitfalls in the use of 
emphasis framing. We discovered that people can perceive this persuasive 
communication technique as manipulative which is particularly problematic when 
people expect informative communications. We addressed emphasis framing by the 
provision of a news article that either emphasized an advantage of CCS (i.e., that it is a 
way to combat global warming) or a disadvantage (i.e., that the technology entails a 
risk of groundwater acidification). We found that no matter which direction people are 
pushed into or how hard they are being pushed, a biased news article is perceived as 
more manipulative than a balanced article. That is, regardless of whether a news 
article reports only on the positive or negative consequences of CCS (one-sided 
framing), or covers both aspects but places emphasis on one of them (two-sided 
framing), the article is perceived as more manipulative than an article that gives equal 
weight to advantages and disadvantages.  
 
We found that people find manipulation inappropriate when news agencies emphasize 
the advantages of CCS in their coverage. In contrast, when oil and gas companies 
emphasize advantages of CCS, people also find this manipulative (even more than 
when done by news agencies), but in this case it does not result in judgments of 
illegitimacy. We demonstrated that this difference is caused by the expectations 
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people have from the communication source. We found that people associate oil and 
gas companies with persuasive communications and news agencies with informative 
communications. This finding is in line with general views that news agencies are 
expected to be balanced (Ryan, 2001) and commercial organizations to be biased (e.g., 
Campbell, 1995). Thus, expectations play a large role in determining whether a 
manipulative communication technique is considered as illegitimate or not.  
 
Finally, the current research indicates that emphasis framing can be effective when it 
comes to influencing people’s attitudes towards CCS. People have a more positive 
attitude towards CCS after reading a positively framed article about the technology 
than after a negatively framed article. This finding in the domain of energy 
technologies adds to previous research on the effectiveness of emphasis framing on 
the shaping of attitudes (Druckman & Bolsen, 2011; Nelson et al., 1997). 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
One might expect that if advantages and disadvantages of an issue receive equal 
weight in a news article, they would cancel out each other’s effect on attitude 
(Druckman et al., 2013). However, we found that people were more positive about CCS 
(and perceived more emphasis on advantages) when equal emphasis was placed on 
the benefits and risks of CCS. This is an interesting finding, moreover because 
participants showed relatively more concern for groundwater pollution (i.e., a risk) 
than for global warming (i.e., a benefit). We ruled out that this effect was due to the 
order in which the advantage and the disadvantage were presented. A possible 
explanation could be that participants perceived the information about CCS in the 
opening paragraph of the article as positive. Although we strived to provide a neutral 
introduction, it conveyed that CCS is a way to meet targets set in international 
agreements to reduce CO2 emissions, which could be regarded as an advantage. 
Importantly, despite this perceived emphasis on advantages over disadvantages, 
participants perceived the balanced article as significantly less manipulative than the 
biased articles. Thus, although the factual description of CCS may not have been 
perceived as completely neutral, this perception has no implications for the impact of 
our experimental manipulations, nor does it undermine the interpretation of our 
results and the validity of our conclusions.  
 
In our experiments with undergraduate students as participants, the level of 
awareness of CCS prior to participation did not affect perceptions of manipulation, 
legitimacy judgments, or attitude towards CCS. However, different processes might 
come into play when people are deeply and personally involved in CCS, for example 
when they live near CCS demonstration sites. Greater personal involvement with an 
issue typically makes people process information more systematically (Chaiken, 1980; 
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Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), which may limit the power of framing (e.g., Brewer 2001; 
Joslyn & Haider-Markel, 2002). Furthermore, local residents are more likely to have 
negative opinions about CCS if they believe that it is unsafe to transport and store CO2, 
or if they fear falls in local property value (Terwel et al., 2012). In that case, they might 
focus primarily on arguments against the implementation of CCS (i.e., selective 
exposure; e.g., Frey, 1986; Hart et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2008) and dismiss any pro-
arguments as manipulative. As a result, it is unlikely that a positively framed message 
will be sufficient to change already existing, strongly negative attitudes. Future 
research could take a closer look at how issue involvement influences the extent to 
which people consider communications as manipulative or (il)legitimate. 
 
We know from prior research that public communications about environmental issues 
are most effective when they fit people’s expectations about their purposes 
(Rabinovich et al., 2012). This would imply that news agencies can best communicate 
about CCS in an informative manner and oil and gas companies can best communicate 
in a persuasive manner. Indeed, the current research seems to suggest that oil and gas 
companies can apply emphasis framing to their communications relatively hassle-free. 
However, framing might not always be the best technique for oil and gas companies. 
That is, this type of company is generally not considered to be very credible when it 
comes to environmental communications (Terwel et al., 2009a), and this low credibility 
could decrease the effectiveness of framing (Druckman, 2001).
15
 Moreover, oil and gas 
companies can be evaluated negatively when they frame their communications about 
CCS. For instance, they may be accused of corporate greenwashing when they frame 
the implementation of CCS as a useful measure to mitigate climate change instead of a 
corporate investment that might help them to make a profit in the long run (de Vries 
et al., in press). A better strategy for oil and gas companies might be to provide 
balanced information about CCS in which both advantages and disadvantages are 
reported. Although balance in CCS communications might be unlikely to influence 
people’s attitudes towards the technology, it might lead to positive long-term effects 
such as increased trust in the integrity of organizations (cf. Terwel et al., 2009a).  
 
In the current research, we considered communications from news agencies and oil 
and gas companies. This leaves open the question of how people might perceive the 
use of emphasis framing by other types of organizations, such as national and local 
government, (environmental) non-governmental organizations, pressure groups and 
scientists. Our findings suggest that it may be possible to predict how people will 
respond to framed messages from such sources, depending on the expectations of the 
                                                 
15
 The survey data support that people have relatively low expectations about oil and gas companies’ 
honesty in communications about CCS. That is, expected honesty is significantly below the midpoint of a 
scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely) (M = 3.14, SD = 1.23), t(844) = -20.36, p < .001. See Appendix A. 
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general public about the overall aims and goals of these parties. When the public 
expects the source to be persuasive in their communications, emphasis framing effects 
should resemble the effects we found when oil and gas companies were the source. 
When the source is expected to be objective, the effects are more likely to be in 
parallel to what we found when news agencies were the source. 
 
Most prior investigations of emphasis framing have examined how framing benefits 
the communicator (e.g., Chong & Druckman, 2007). However, so far, less attention has 
been paid to potentially negative aspects that may only become apparent over time. 
As such, the identification of pitfalls in the use of emphasis framing contributes to 
literature. We discovered two (related) pitfalls that are likely to be highly important: 
perceptions of manipulation and judgments of illegitimacy.  
 
Future research might extend our findings, for instance by taking into account 
behavioral effects of perceiving illegitimate manipulation. It would be interesting to 
investigate the number of subscribers that would discontinue a newspaper when 
perceiving their paper’s coverage as biased.
16
 Alternatively, future research could take 
into account effects such as the number of people completely discarding information 
from a source that is seen as—legitimately—framing its communications. We would 
anticipate perceived manipulation and legitimacy judgments to be relevant for such 
effects. In this way, our results offer a starting point for further research into the 
pitfalls in the use of emphasis framing and the conditions under which they occur. 
 
                                                 
16
 CCS coverage has shown to be focused on benefits, rather than risks (Feldpausch-Parker et al., 2013). 
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Over a decade ago, British Petroleum (BP) announced to “go green”. This was a unique 
event in the energy industry at that time. Besides introducing a new green logo, BP 
launched an expensive publicity campaign to show its concern for the environment 
and to communicate its investment in environmental measures (Muralidharan et al., 
2011). However, not everybody was convinced that BP was truly concerned about the 
environment (LeMenestrel et al., 2002). Since the launch of the Go Green campaign, 
environmentalists kept on challenging BP’s activities and messages, and corporate 
credibility was low (García, 2011). In 2008, BP even received Greenpeace’s Worst 
Greenwash award for announcing its commitment to alternative energy sources while 
at the same time allocating 93 percent of its total investment fund to the development 
and extraction of fossil fuels (“BP wins ‘Emerald Paintbrush’ award”, 2008). Thus, the 
Go Green campaign only seemed to have backfired. This is in contrast to the finding 
that positive information about a firm’s corporate social responsibility may have a 
positive effect on corporate reputation (Alniacik et al., 2011) and may even lead to 
attainment of external awards for good environmental performance (Hassan & 
Ibrahim, 2012). In this article, we examine when and why people might respond 
negatively to oil and gas companies that engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
activities in the environmental domain. More specifically, we report a series of three 
experiments designed to determine how the motive that oil and gas companies 
communicate for investing in environmental measures affects public perceptions of 
corporate greenwashing.  
 
Corporate Greenwashing 
Corporate greenwashing refers to the idea that a company misrepresents corporate 
activities as “green” in order to look more environmentally friendly than it actually is 
(e.g., Laufer, 2003; Vos, 2009). Corporate greenwashing can take many different forms. 
For instance, a company may provide the public with disinformation in order to repair 
or shape its reputation (Laufer, 2003), or it may publish an environmental promise 
without living up to it (i.e., “talking the talk without walking the walk”, Vos, 2009). 
However, instead of lying outright, corporate greenwashing is typically associated with 
a gap between rhetoric and reality; the truth about corporate social responsibility is 
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sometimes bended, overstated, or misrepresented in public communications (Vos, 
2009). An oil and gas company that emphasizes to invest in alternative energy 
technologies, while it is in fact only allocating a fraction of its budget to this cause, may 
be seen as an example in this regard. Regardless of the company’s intentions, in the 
end it is all about whether or not people perceive corporate greenwashing. People may 
suspect corporate greenwashing when it is absent by objective criteria, and vice versa. 
When a company engages in greenwashing, but people do not perceive it as such, 
harmful consequences might not come off. However, when people suspect 
greenwashing, a range of detrimental consequences may occur including consumer 
protest and boycott, and financial loss for the company (e.g., Polonsky, 1995; Polonsky 
& Rosenberger III, 2001).  
 
The literature on corporate greenwashing tends to be theoretical rather than empirical 
in nature and it mainly focuses on the consequences rather than the antecedents of 
greenwashing. Therefore, we seek to identify causal relationships between how 
companies communicate their environmental engagement to the public and how 
people perceive these companies in terms of corporate greenwashing. We specifically 
focus on oil and gas companies because these are the types of organizations that run 
the greatest risk of being accused of greenwashing when communicating about 
environmental policies. That is, the public typically regards these companies as profit-
focused polluters rather than as environmentalists (Muralidharan et al., 2011). People 
may find it hard to believe that oil and gas companies adopt environmental policies 
out of sincere concern with the planet in view of their primary goal of producing 
energy by burning “dirty” fossil fuels.  
 
Indeed, research shows that the effectiveness of engaging in CSR activities to gain the 
favors of the public depends on the apparent functional fit between the type of activity 
and the company’s core business (Alcañiz, Cáceres, & Pérez, 2010; Yoon et al., 2006; 
also see Melo & Garrido-Morgado, 2012). As Yoon and colleagues (2006) suggest, the 
likelihood that engaging in CSR activities creates a favorable company image is reduced 
when companies with bad reputations (e.g., companies in the tobacco and energy 
industries) engage in activities in the domain of the company’s core business. In their 
research, people evaluated a (fictitious) cigarette manufacturer more negatively when 
it indicated financial support for cancer research than when it indicated support for 
environmental protection. This result suggests that consumers regard a company’s 
positive action (supporting cancer research) as insincere when it conflicts with the 
consequences of the company’s core business (producing cigarettes). In a similar vein, 
people may suspect greenwashing when an oil and gas company invests in 
environmental measures because, at first sight, this investment seems to conflict with 
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the consequences of the company’s core business (i.e., producing energy by burning 
fossil fuels). 
 
Communicated Motives and Suspicion of Strategic Behavior 
One strategy for oil and gas companies to address public perceptions of greenwashing 
is to explicitly indicate the motive underlying their investments. Organizations can 
have a range of different motives for their involvement with (environmental) CSR 
activities (e.g., Babiak & Trendafilova, 2011; Ellen, Webb, & Mohr, 2006). These 
motives are often classified into two primary categories: public-serving motives and 
firm-serving motives (Forehand & Grier, 2003). Public-serving motives reflect 
organizational concern for the collective interest (e.g., conservation of the natural 
environment), where firm-serving motives reflect concern for benefits for the 
organization itself (e.g., maximizing company profit).  
 
Oil and gas companies might be inclined to communicate their environmental policies 
in terms of concern for the environment (i.e., a public-serving motive) in order to 
convey a sense of environment responsibility. However, given the company’s core 
business, people may be suspicious about the truthfulness of this claim; they may 
doubt the company’s authenticity and start to suspect ulterior motives (see Fein, 1996; 
Forehand & Grier, 2003; Hilton, Fein, & Miller, 1993; Yoon et al., 2006).
17
 That is, the 
motives of oil and gas companies are generally inferred to be firm-serving instead of 
public-serving (Spangler & Pompper, 2011; Terwel et al., 2009b), so people easily 
suspect that even though the company communicates an environmental motive, it is 
actually primarily interested in enhancing the corporate image, eliciting publicity, and 
satisfying its customers. Suspicion of such strategic behavior could lead people to view 
the company as less sincere (Campbell & Karmani, 2000; Terwel et al., 2009b) or even 
deceitful (Chan, Leung, & Wong, 2006). In short, people may regard the 
communication of environmental motives as rhetoric rather than reality. Accordingly, 
we predict that people are likely to perceive greenwashing when an oil and gas 
company communicates an environmental motive for its investment in environmental 
measures.  
 
On the other hand, we propose that expressing an economic motive for this 
investment is a more fruitful way for an oil and gas company to avoid being perceived 
as greenwashing, because this should activate less suspicion. After all, oil and gas 
companies are expected to act upon economic motives and, therefore, the 
                                                 
17
 Forehand and Grier (2003) coined the term situational skepticism for this “momentary state of distrust of 
an actor’s motivations”. 
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communication of such motives (e.g., profit maximization by trading CO2 emissions) is 
probably seen as a plausible and truthful reason to invest. Therefore, we hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 4.1: People perceive less greenwashing when an oil and 
gas company communicates an economic motive for its investment 
in environmental measures than when it communicates an 
environmental motive. 
 
Hypothesis 4.2: Suspicion of strategic behavior mediates the effect 





In this paper, dispositional skepticism refers to an individual’s general tendency to 
doubt the credibility of various forms of organizational communication (Ford, Smith, & 
Swasy, 1990; Forehand & Grier, 2003; Obermiller & Spangenberg, 1998). Clearly, 
people differ in the extent to which they are skeptical. The more skeptical people are, 
the more they generally doubt the credibility of organizational communications 
(regardless of their contents). So-called skeptics will always be suspicious about true 
motives when they are confronted with organizational communications. Accordingly, 
for skeptics we do not expect that the perception of corporate greenwashing depends 
on the communicated motive. This implies that the predicted indirect effect of 
communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing through suspicion of 
strategic behavior (as stated in Hypothesis 4.2) is moderated by dispositional 
skepticism toward organizational communications. Thus, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 4.3: Dispositional skepticism toward organizational 
communications moderates the indirect effect of communicated 
motive on perceived corporate greenwashing through suspicion of 
strategic behavior.  
 
The Present Research 
We have designed three experiments to test our hypotheses. All three experiments 
have the same experimental setup, in which participants learn about an oil and gas 
company that invests in the development of a CO2 emission reduction technology.  
 
The first experiment examines to what extent people perceive greenwashing when the 
oil and gas company communicates an economic motive, an environmental motive, or 
no motive for its investment (Hypothesis 4.1). The second experiment aims to replicate 
the findings of Experiment 4.1 and further examines whether suspicion of strategic 
behavior mediates the effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate 
                                                 
18
 Perceived greenwashing and suspicion of strategic behavior are related concepts, but it is relevant to 
differentiate between the two. After all, one can suspect strategic behavior, but not perceive greenwashing. 
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we used a fictitious instead of a real company in order to prevent distortion of the 
results due to pre-existing brand perceptions (Aggarwal, 2004; Wagner, Lutz, & Weitz, 
2009). After participants had received some bogus background information about 
Baptiste Oil and Gas, we presented them with the company’s website. This website 
contained the manipulation of the company’s motive for investing in CCS. We created 
a website because companies often use websites as a communication channel for CSR 
communications (e.g., Tagesson, Blank, Broberg, & Collin, 2009). For participants in the 
‘environmental motive’ condition, the website read:  
 
Baptiste Oil and Gas invests in the development of CCS because this 
is in line with our corporate social responsibility policy. If we do not 
invest in this technology now, the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere 
will continue to increase, causing the mean temperature on earth to 
rise. This has several negative effects for humankind and nature, like 
disturbance of the present ecosystems, extinction of some plant- 
and animal species, and a rising sea level, with all its consequences. 
By implementing CCS on a large scale, less CO2 will be emitted into 
the air, which makes it possible to prevent the aforementioned 
ecological problems. In short, we invest in the development of CCS 
because of the natural environment.  
 
For participants in the ‘economic motive’ condition, the website read:  
 
Baptiste Oil and Gas invests in the development of CCS because we 
expect to profit from it in the long run. By being involved in the 
development of this technology, we gain important knowledge and 
experience. In the future, we can export this expertise. This will have 
beneficial effects on our turnover. Also, we expect to enhance our 
profit by trading our emission rights, the so-called emissions trade. 
Firms have the right to emit a certain amount of CO2. By using CCS, 
Baptiste Oil and Gas will emit almost no CO2, but remains the rights 
to emit it. Therefore, we can sell our rights to other companies in 
order to enable them to emit more CO2 than they are entitled to. In 
short, we invest in the development of CCS because of the profit. 
 
Participants in the ‘no motive’ (i.e., control) condition did not read a motive for the 
company’s investment in CCS.  
 
After the manipulation, we measured perceived corporate greenwashing by the item: 
“To what extent do you think that Baptiste Oil and Gas aims to improve its reputation 
by presenting itself as an environmentally friendly organization?” (1 = not at all; 7 = 
very much). Furthermore, to assess the adequacy of the manipulation, all participants 
were asked to indicate the motive that Baptiste Oil and Gas communicated on its 
website by checking one out of four answers: (1) “I did not read why Baptiste Oil and 
Gas invests in CCS”, (2) “Baptiste Oil and Gas invests in CCS to make a profit”, (3) 
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“Baptiste Oil and Gas invests in CCS out of concern for the natural environment”, or (4) 
“Baptiste Oil and Gas invests in CCS because of legal obligations to reduce CO2 
emissions”.  
 
Nineteen participants in the ‘no motive’ condition correctly indicated that they did not 
read any motive. Eighteen participants in the ‘economic motive’ condition correctly 
indicated that the motive was to make a profit. Twenty participants in the 
‘environmental motive’ condition correctly indicated that the motive was concern for 
the environment. Twenty-two participants failed to indicate the communicated motive 
correctly. Their responses were excluded from the analysis reported here to ensure 
the most reliable results and conclusions (although the results were virtually identical 
when the responses of these participants were included in the analysis). Finally, 
participants were debriefed, paid, and thanked for their participation. 
 
Results 
Perceived corporate greenwashing. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Communicated 
Motive as the between-subjects variable and perceived corporate greenwashing as the 
dependent variable revealed a significant effect, F(2, 54) = 15.52, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .37. 
Participants who read an environmental motive (M = 5.50, SD = 0.83) or no motive (M 
= 5.79, SD = 0.71) perceived significantly more corporate greenwashing than 
participants who read an economic motive (M = 3.56, SD = 2.06).  
 
Experiment 4.2 
The results of Experiment 4.1 suggest that people tend to perceive corporate 
greenwashing when they learn about an oil and gas company that invests in 
environmental measures. In support of Hypothesis 4.1, Experiment 4.1 further shows 
that communicating an economic motive reduces perceived greenwashing (relative to 
when no motive is communicated), but that communicating an environmental motive 
neither reduces nor increases perceived greenwashing. Experiment 4.2 aims to 
examine whether suspicion of strategic behavior mediates the effect of communicated 
motive on perceived corporate greenwashing (Hypothesis 4.2).  
 
Method 
Participants and design. Fifty-seven undergraduate students from Leiden University 
were allocated to one of two experimental conditions (Communicated Motive: 
environmental motive vs. economic motive) and received either €1 or course credits 
for their participation. Those who had participated in Experiment 4.1 were not allowed 
to participate in Experiment 4.2.  
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Procedure. The procedure was largely similar to the procedure of Experiment 4.1. 
Differences were that the measure of perceived greenwashing was extended in order 
to enhance its reliability, the control (i.e., no motive) condition was omitted, and items 
were included to assess suspicion of strategic behavior. To assess the adequacy of the 
manipulation, participants were asked to indicate the motive that Baptiste Oil and Gas 
communicated by checking one out of four answers. The first three answers equaled 
the answers from Experiment 4.1 (i.e., no motive, economic motive, environmental 
motive). The last answer differed: “Baptiste Oil and Gas invests in CCS to make a profit 
as well as out of concern for the natural environment”. 
 
Twenty-three participants in the ‘economic motive’ condition correctly indicated that 
the motive communicated by the company was to make a profit and twenty-three 
participants in the ‘environmental motive’ condition correctly indicated that the 
communicated motive was concern for the environment. Eleven participants failed to 
indicate the communicated motive correctly. Again, the data of these participants 
were excluded from the analyses reported here, but the results were virtually identical 
when these cases were included in the analyses.  
 
Measures 
Perceived corporate greenwashing. We added two items to the measure used in 
Experiment 4.1 to create a three-item scale (α = .83): “I think Baptiste Oil and Gas aims 
to improve its reputation by presenting itself as an environmentally friendly 
organization.” (1 = totally disagree; 7 = totally agree), “To what extent do you think 
Baptiste Oil and Gas has a hidden agenda?” (1 = not at all; 7 = very much), “I think 
Baptiste Oil and Gas pretends to be more environmentally friendly than it actually is.” 
(1 = totally disagree; 7 = totally agree). 
 
Suspicion of strategic behavior. We assessed suspicion of strategic behavior with four 
items (α = .79). Participants had to indicate to what extent they thought Baptiste Oil 
and Gas invested in CCS because the company: “…thinks that consumers expect the 
company to do that”, “…wants to have a positive image”, “…intends to get publicity”, 
and “…hopes to get more clients” (1 = totally disagree; 7 = totally agree).  
 
Principal component analyses with a Varimax rotation showed that suspicion of 
strategic behavior and perception of corporate greenwashing represented different 
constructs. The items loaded on two separate components explaining a total variance 
of 68.3%. The eigenvalue of the first component (suspicion of strategic behavior) was 
3.61; the eigenvalue of the second component (perceived corporate greenwashing) 
was 1.18.  
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Results 
Perceived corporate greenwashing. We conducted an ANOVA with Communicated 
Motive as the between-subjects variable and perceived corporate greenwashing as the 
dependent variable, which revealed a significant effect, F(1, 44) = 11.11, p = .002, ηp
2
 = 
.20. Consistent with Hypothesis 4.1, participants who read an environmental motive 
perceived more corporate greenwashing (M = 4.96, SD = 0.94) than participants who 
read an economic motive (M = 3.65, SD = 1.63). 
 
Suspicion of strategic behavior. An ANOVA with Communicated Motive as the 
between-subjects variable and suspicion of strategic behavior as the dependent 
variable also revealed a significant effect, F(1, 44) = 13.81, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .24. 
Participants suspected more strategic behavior after reading an environmental motive 
(M = 5.54, SD = 0.83) than after reading an economic motive (M = 4.26, SD = 1.43).  
 
Mediation 
Following the procedure specified by Baron and Kenny (1986), we performed 
regression analyses to test the hypothesis that suspicion of strategic behavior 
mediates the effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing 
(Hypothesis 4.2). We first assessed the effect of communicated motive on perceived 
greenwashing. As shown before, this effect was significant (β = .45, p = .002). 
Mediation further requires an effect of communicated motive on suspicion of strategic 
behavior (i.e., the proposed mediator). This effect was significant as well (β = .49, p = 
.001). Mediation also requires an effect of suspicion of strategic behavior on perceived 
corporate greenwashing (controlling for the effect of communicated motive). This 
effect was significant (β = .42, p = .005). The final requirement for mediation is that the 
effect of the independent variable (i.e., Communicated Motive) on the dependent 
variable (i.e., perceived corporate greenwashing) disappears or is significantly reduced 
when taking into account the effect of the mediator (i.e., suspicion of strategic 
behavior). The effect of communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing 
disappeared when the effect of suspicion of strategic behavior was taken into account 
(β = .24, p = .10). The magnitude of the indirect effect was significant (Sobel z = 2.28, p 
= .02), indicating mediation.  
 
This finding was supported by the bootstrapping approach to test for mediation 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008). This approach uses resampling of raw data to estimate the 
confidence interval (CI) of the indirect effect. We used 10000 resamples (bias 
corrected and accelerated intervals) and obtained a 95% confidence interval that did 
not include zero (lower CI = .23; upper CI = 1.17). Thus, in support of Hypothesis 4.2, 
the results of both regression and bootstrap analyses indicate that suspicion of 
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Method 
Participants and design. Fifty-eight undergraduate students from Leiden University 
were allocated to one of two experimental conditions. In one condition, an 
environmental motive for investing in CCS was provided and an economic motive was 
denied. In the other condition, an economic motive was provided and an 
environmental motive was denied. Those who had participated in Experiment 4.1 or 
Experiment 4.2 were not allowed to participate in Experiment 4.3. Participants 
received either €1 or course credits for their participation.  
 
Procedure. The procedure was largely similar to the procedure used in Experiment 4.1 
and Experiment 4.2. Participants first received background information which was 
followed by the manipulation of the motive that Baptiste Oil and Gas communicated 
for investing in CCS. We manipulated the communicated motive in the same way as in 
the previous experiments, but this time the alternative motive was denied. So, in the 
‘environmental motive’ condition, Baptiste Oil and Gas stated to invest in CCS because 
of the environment and not to make a profit (i.e., denial of the alternative motive). In 
the ‘economic motive’ condition, it stated to invest in CCS to make a profit and not 
because of the environment. Next, we assessed perceived greenwashing, suspicion of 
strategic behavior, and dispositional skepticism toward organizational 
communications. Finally, participants were debriefed, paid, and thanked for their 
participation.  
 
To check the adequacy of the manipulation, participants were asked to indicate the 
motive Baptiste Oil and Gas communicated for investing in CCS: “Baptiste Oil and Gas 
invests in CCS to make a profit and not because of the natural environment”, or 
“Baptiste Oil and Gas invests in CCS out of concern for the natural environment and 
not because of the profit”. Twenty-eight participants in the ‘economic motive’ 
condition (with denial of an environmental motive) indicated that Baptiste Oil and Gas 
communicated to invest in CCS to make a profit and not because of the environment. 
Twenty-six participants in the ‘environmental motive’ condition (with denial of an 
economic motive) indicated that Baptiste Oil and Gas communicated to invest in CCS 
out of concern for the environment and not to make a profit. Four participants failed 
to indicate the communicated motive correctly. The responses of these four 
participants were not included in further analyses, but the results were virtually 






72 | Chapter 4 
 
Measures 
Perceived corporate greenwashing. We measured perceived corporate greenwashing 
with the same three items as in Experiment 4.2 (α = .72).  
 
Suspicion of strategic behavior. We measured suspicion of strategic behavior with the 
same four items as in Experiment 4.2 (α = .82). 
 
Dispositional skepticism. We measured dispositional skepticism toward organizational 
communications by means of four items based on a scale developed by Obermiller and 
Spangenberg (1998) (α = .91): “Organizational communications are a reliable source of 
information.”, “In general, organizational communications present a true picture.”, ”I 
think that organizational communications are generally truthful.”, and “I feel I have 
been accurately informed after viewing most organizational communications.” (1 = 
completely disagree; 7 = completely agree). Scores were reverse coded so that higher 
scores represent higher dispositional skepticism. 
 
Results 
Perceived corporate greenwashing. We conducted an ANOVA to assess the effect of 
Communicated Motive on perceived corporate greenwashing, which revealed a 
significant effect, F(1, 52) = 27.54, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .35. Participants perceived less 
corporate greenwashing when Baptiste Oil and Gas communicated an economic 
motive (M = 3.43, SD = 1.51) than when it communicated an environmental motive (M 
= 5.17, SD = 0.79). This result yields further support for Hypothesis 4.1.  
 
Suspicion of strategic behavior. We further conducted an ANOVA to assess the effect 
of Communicated Motive on suspicion of strategic behavior, which revealed a 
significant effect as well, F(1, 52) = 15.32, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .23. Participants in the 
‘environmental motive’ condition suspected more strategic behavior (M = 5.87, SD = 
0.69) than participants in the ‘economic motive’ condition (M = 4.61, SD = 1.50).  
 
Dispositional skepticism. We also checked for potential differences between 
conditions regarding dispositional skepticism toward organizational communications. 
We did not expect a difference because dispositional skepticism is a stable trait and 
unlikely to be affected by the motive Baptiste Oil and Gas communicated. This 
expectation was supported by the ANOVA, which revealed no difference between 
conditions, F(1, 52) = 0.55, p = .46, ηp
2






We performed a series of regression analyses to examine whether suspicion of 
strategic behavior mediated the effect of communicated motive on perceived 
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statistically significant (p < .05) for any value of dispositional skepticism ≤ to 5.5 on the 
scale ranging from 1 (low) to 7 (high). These results offer support for the conditional 
indirect effect as stated in Hypothesis 4.3, namely that the effect of communicated 
motive on perceptions of corporate greenwashing through suspicion of strategic 
behavior occurs under low or moderate (but not high) levels of dispositional skepticism 
toward organizational communications in general (see Figure 4.1). 
 
General Discussion 
Oil and gas companies investing in environmental measures might be inclined to 
motivate this investment by environmental concern because this may have a positive 
effect on corporate evaluations (Alniacik et al., 2011; Hassan & Ibrahim, 2012). By 
doing so, they run the risk of being accused of corporate greenwashing (i.e., that a 
company misrepresents corporate activities as “green” in order to look more 
environmentally friendly than it actually is), however. The detrimental effects of being 
perceived as greenwashing (consumer protest and boycott, financial loss) are relatively 
well-documented (Laufer, 2003; Polonsky, 1995; Polonsky & Rosenberger III, 2001). 
The current experimental research is the first to explicitly examine when and why 
people perceive corporate greenwashing and, thereby, it contributes to the broader 
literature about the effects of engaging in CSR activities on consumer evaluations 
(Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; Forehand & Grier, 2003; Yoon et al., 2006).  
 
We conducted a series of three experiments to systematically examine perceptions of 
corporate greenwashing in a situation where a (fictitious) oil and gas company 
communicates its investment in the development of a CO2 emission reduction 
technology to the public. In line with our hypothesis, the results consistently show that 
people perceive significantly less corporate greenwashing when an oil and gas 
company communicates an economic motive for the investment than when it 
communicates an environmental motive. This effect persists if the company denies the 
alternative motive. Our research further demonstrates that the effect of 
communicated motive on perceived corporate greenwashing is mediated by suspicion 
of strategic organizational behavior. This is primarily true for those who are not by 
nature (i.e., as a dispositional trait) very skeptical toward organizational 
communications in general. So-called skeptics will always doubt the truthfulness of 
these communications, regardless of their contents. 
 
Thus, people tend to suspect strategic behavior and, consequently, perceive 
greenwashing when an oil and gas company communicates an environmental motive 
for its environmental policies. This is in line with the fact that the public generally 
expects oil and gas companies to act upon firm-serving motives rather than public-
serving motives (e.g., Spangler & Pompper, 2011; Terwel et al., 2009b). As a result, 
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people easily suspect an oil and gas company that communicates environmental (i.e., 
public-serving) motives to have ulterior motives (and thus to pretend to be greener 
than it actually is). By contrast, people suspect less strategic behavior when an oil and 
gas company communicates an economic motive for investing in environmental 
measures, which is consistent with the idea that companies that express firm-serving 




Importantly, our research suggests that it may be a useful strategy for oil and gas 
companies to acknowledge economic considerations for engaging in sustainable 
activities or any CSR initiative in the environmental domain. At the same time, this 
seems to morally challenge those companies with genuine concern for the 
environment. After all, it may be better to be silent about this environmental concern 
in order to avoid being accused of corporate greenwashing. However, this in itself 
reflects some kind of strategic behavior. A solution for this moral challenge could be to 
express environmental concern, while acknowledging economic considerations as well. 
That is, companies with genuine environmental concern will also have an economic 
concern. Although it seems a good practice from a societal perspective to pursue 
sustainable initiatives that need not lead to financial gain (i.e., social stewardship), it is 
probably non-existing among oil and gas companies because it is not a viable 
management approach under the current business and regulatory conditions (Dutta, 
Lawson, & Marcinko, 2012). For companies that have both economic and 
environmental concern, it might be a better strategy to communicate these concerns 
simultaneously. People not only value pro-environmental actions, they also appreciate 
honesty (Terwel et al., 2009b). This connects to the concept of shared value positing 
that there is merit in bringing business and society back together (e.g., Porter & 
Kramer, 2011). However, further research is needed to confirm whether oil and gas 
companies are indeed less likely to be seen as greenwashing when they communicate 
both environmental and economic motives for a green investment. 
 
In terms of public policy, and specifically with regard to the reporting of environmental 
policies and initiatives, several issues are worth noting. As Melo and Garrido-Morgado 
(2012) point out, adopting environmental policies and initiatives is only one CSR 
dimension and how this tends to affect corporate reputation depends on the specific 
                                                 
19
 The survey data support the idea that people expect oil and gas companies to have firm-serving motives 
over public-serving motives. For example, people think that oil and gas companies feel more responsibility 
for their economic performance (economic CSR, M = 5.33, SD = 1.00) than for their environmental impact 
(environmental CSR, M = 3.45, SD = 1.26), t(844) = 34.82, p < .001. More specifically, people find it more 
plausible that oil and gas companies are involved in the development of CCS because they can make a profit 
from it in the long run (economic motive, M = 5.00, SD = 1.26), than because CCS is beneficial for the natural 
environment (environmental motive, M = 3.40, SD = 1.41), t(844) = 21.76, p < .001. See Appendix A. 
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industrial sector of the company.
20
 That is, it seems that environmental performance 
damages corporate reputation in some sectors, but in other sectors (e.g., the 
resources industry and other industries with salient environmental issues) it can have a 
positive effect (similar findings are reported by Brammer & Pavelin, 2006). The current 
research suggests that the reputations of companies in the energy sector are unlikely 
to improve when such companies decide to communicate environmental motives for 
investing in environmental measures. Messages like these are easily perceived as 
rhetoric and might shift public attention away from the company’s actual sustainable 
(and valued) actions, which is less likely to be the case when companies acknowledge 
that economic considerations play a role. After all, the public will understand that 
social stewardship is not an effective management strategy (Dutta et al., 2012) and, 
hence, that companies pursue only sustainable and socially responsible initiatives that 
do not go at the direct expense of a company’s interests. Considering that 
environmental motives are probably not the only reason for companies to invest in 
environmental measures, it seems advisable from a strategic perspective to be reticent 
in claiming purely altruistic motives in public communications in order to avoid being 
perceived as greenwashing. In relation to this point, the standardization of corporate 
environmental reporting might reduce the chance of being perceived as greenwashing. 
Worldwide, many companies voluntarily report their environmental performances, but 
public policy about environmental reporting is not yet very widespread and formalized 
(Cerin, 2002; Kolk & Perego, 2010; see also “Sustainability reporting fails to take off in 
the United States”, 2012). If guidelines are developed and relevant regulations are 
observed, communications about environmental policies and initiatives might no 
longer be perceived as some kind of strategic behavior on the part of the company, but 
rather as compliance with public policy and, therefore, deemed more acceptable.  
 
In a related fashion, one of the reasons to invest in environmental measures aimed at 
reducing CO2 emissions may be that a company is legally obliged to cut back its CO2 
emissions (Escobar & Vredenburg, 2011). Indeed, a large number of countries have 
committed themselves in international agreements (like the Kyoto protocol) to reduce 
their CO2 emissions in an attempt to mitigate climate change. To this end, 
governments have developed legislation to be able to force oil and gas companies to 
limit their CO2 emissions. In order to comply with such legislations, oil and gas 
                                                 
20
 The survey data show that the general impression people have of oil and gas companies is relatively 
negative. That is, it is significantly below the midpoint of a scale from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive) (M 
= 3.36, SD = 1.24), t(844) = -14.87, p < .001. Furthermore, the data show that the general image of oil and gas 
companies is very strongly related to how these companies are evaluated on the environmental CSR 
dimension (r = .73). See Appendix A (also for correlations between general image and evaluations on other 
CSR dimensions).  
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companies can decide to invest in technologies like CCS. If this is communicated to the 




Finally, the current research is relevant, albeit more indirectly, for the endorsement of 
the environmental measures and technologies by the public. That is, knowledge of 
corporate tactics can influence people’s attitudes toward companies (Friestad & 
Wright, 1994) which, in turn, may influence whether or not people endorse the 
positions advocated by these companies. For instance, Terwel and colleagues (2009a) 
found that people became more negative about CCS when they placed little trust in 
the integrity of organizations that support the implementation of CCS. In a similar vein, 
when people believe that a company’s investment in CCS is an act of greenwashing, 
this may not only affect reactions to the organization, but also attitudes to this climate 
change mitigation technology itself.  
 
The current research shows that people typically tend to suspect corporate 
greenwashing when oil and gas companies invest in environmental measures, but also 
that such suspicions can be reduced by acknowledging economic motives for such 
investments. This is because people are much less likely to suspect strategic 
behavior—corporate actions aimed at image enhancement and public relations—when 
firm-serving (economic) rather than public-serving (environmental) motives are 
communicated. This indirect effect primarily occurs among people who are not by 
nature very skeptical toward organizational communications in general. Our findings 
highlight the need for companies in the energy sector to think carefully about how to 
communicate their environmental policies to the public; most people appreciate 
corporate social initiatives, but it backfires when communications about CSR activate 
suspicions of corporate greenwashing.  
                                                 
21
 The survey reveals that people find the motive that oil and gas companies are involved in CCS because of 
legal obligations a little less plausible (M = 4.83, SD = 1.23) than an economic motive (M = 5.00, SD = 1.26), 
t(844) = 2.99, p = .003. People do not have much faith that oil and gas companies feel as much responsibility 
for legal issues in general (legal CSR, M = 3.55, SD = 1.33) as for their economic performance (economic CSR, 







A survey among a representative sample of the Dutch population was conducted to 
provide external validity to the experimental research. The main aim of the survey was 
to get insight in public perceptions about oil and gas companies in relation to CCS. 
Furthermore, the survey assessed general environmental beliefs, perceptions about 
CCS, and perceptions about corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
 
Method  
Sample. The survey was administered to a sample of 845 respondents representative 
of the adult population of the Netherlands (51% female, mean age 49.7 years). Of this 
sample, 328 individuals (39%) indicated to have never heard about CCS before. 
Respondents were invited to complete the questionnaire based on their registration in 
a large database of the professional research agency that executed the survey (TNS 
NIPO).  
 
Procedure. The 10-minute survey was conducted online from September 24 until 
October 1, 2013 after it had been pre-tested among a student sample at Leiden 
University. Perceptions about CSR and environmental beliefs were assessed first. Then, 
after a brief introduction of CCS, items followed to measure perceptions about CCS, 
and perceptions about oil and gas companies in relation to CCS. 
 
Results 
Measures, items, and coefficients of internal consistency are provided in Table A.1. 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations are shown in Table A.2.  
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Table A.1 
Measures, items and coefficients of internal consistency.  
 
Motive to invest in CCS: To what extent do you think that oil and gas companies are 
involved in the development of CCS… (1 = not at all; 7 = 
completely) 
1. Economic Motive … because they can make a profit from it in the long run 
2. Legal Motive … because of legal obligations 
3. Ethical Motive … out of ethical considerations 
4. CSR Motive … out of corporate social responsibility 
5. Environmental Motive … because it is beneficial for the natural environment 
6. Greening Motive  … to get an environmentally friendly image 
7. Fit with CCS 
(α = .86) 
To what extent do you think it is logical that oil and gas 
companies are involved in the development of CCS?  
(1 = not at all; 7 = completely) 
 
To what extent do you think that CCS suits the activities of 
oil and gas companies? (1 = not at all; 7 = completely) 
8. Expected Manipulation 
(α = .89) 
To what extent do you expect that oil and gas companies will 
try to …  
(1 = not at all; 7 = completely) 
 … manipulate people’s opinion about CCS? 
 … convince people of their own ideas about CCS? 
 … influence public opinion about CCS? 
9. Expected Honesty  
(α = .88) 
To what extent do you expect that information from oil and 
gas companies about CCS will be honest? (1 = not at all; 7 = 
completely) 
 
To what extent do you expect that information from oil and 
gas companies about CCS will be objective? (1 = not at all; 7 
= completely) 
10. Environmental Concern  
(α = .87) 
 
Indicate for each of the following environmental issues to 
what extent you think it is a problem for our society (1 = no 
problem at all; 7 = a big problem) 
(based on Dunlap, Van Liere, 
Mertig, & Jones, 2000) 
Air pollution and smog 
 Pollution of rivers, lakes, and oceans 
 Loss of the rain forests and jungles 
 
Climate change, global warming, also known as the 
greenhouse effect 
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11. Dominant Social Worldview  
(α = .80) 
Indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with each 
of the statements below (1 = completely disagree; 7 = 
completely agree) 
(based on Dunlap et al., 2000) 
Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to 
suit their needs 
 Human ingenuity will ensure that we do not make the earth 
unlivable 
 The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn 
how to develop them 
 
The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the 
impacts of modern industrial nations 
 
The so-called ‘ecological crisis’ facing humankind has been 
greatly exaggerated 
 Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature 
 
Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature 
works to be able to control it 
12. Attitude towards CCS Indicate below what you think about CCS. 
(α = .95)  “I find CCS….” (1 = bad; 7 = good) 
(based on Petty & Cacioppo, 
1984) 
“I find CCS….” (1 = harmful; 7 = beneficial) 
 “I find CCS….” (1 = foolish; 7 = wise) 
 “I find CCS….” (1 = unfavorable; 7 = favorable) 
13. CCS Tampering with Nature 
(α = .91) 
Indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with 
each of the statements below (1 = completely disagree; 7 = 
completely agree) 
(based on Sjöberg, 2000) The implementation of CCS goes against nature 
 
The implementation of CCS can turn into a catastrophe 
because humans try to influence the basic processes and 
structures of nature 
 CCS is an ‘unnatural’ activity 
 
The implementation of CCS is an expression of human 
arrogance 
 
Any negative effects of CCS for the environment will 
probably increase over time 
 CCS has risks because nature will be disturbed 
 CCS is unfair and immoral 
14. Importance of CSR 
(α = .82) 
Indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with 
each of the statements below (1 = completely disagree; 7 = 
completely agree) 
(based on Maignan, 2001) 
I would pay more to buy products from a socially 
responsible company 
 When I buy things, I consider the ethical reputation of 
businesses 
 
I avoid buying products from companies that have 
behaved immorally 
 
I would pay more to buy products from a company that 
shows to care about the wellbeing of our society 
 
If the price and quality of two products are the same, I 
would buy the product from the firm that has a good 
reputation concerning CSR 
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15. Economic CSR  
(α = .66) 
Indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with 
each of the statements below (1 = completely disagree; 7 = 
completely agree) 
(based on Maignan, 2001) Oil and gas companies try to maximize their profits 
 Oil and gas companies control their production costs 
strictly 
 Oil and gas companies plan for their long-term success 
 
Oil and gas companies always try to improve economic 
performance 
16. Legal CSR  
(α = .87) 
Oil and gas companies always submit to the principles 
defined by the regulatory system 
(based on Maignan, 2001) 




Oil and gas companies do not break the law, not even if this 
helps improve performance 
 
Oil and gas companies ensure that their employees act 
within the standards defined by the law 
17. Ethical CSR  
(α = .84) 
Oil and gas companies ensure that the respect of ethical 
principles (‘doing good’) has priority over economic 
performance 
(based on Maignan, 2001) 
Oil and gas companies permit that economic performance 
can be negatively affected by ethical concerns 
 
Oil and gas companies be committed to well-defined ethics 
principles 
 
Oil and gas companies avoid achieving corporate goals that 
compromise ethical standards 
18. Philantropic CSR 
(α = .85)  
Oil and gas companies allocate some of their resources to 
philanthropic activities 
(based on Maignan, 2001) 
Oil and gas companies participate in the management of 
public affairs 
 Oil and gas companies help solve social problems 
 
Oil and gas companies play a role in our society that goes 
beyond the mere generation of profits 
19. Environmental CSR 
(α = .89) 
Oil and gas companies do anything in their power to reduce 
the negative impact of their activities on the natural 
environment  
(based on Chow & Chen, 2012; 
Turker, 2009) 
Oil and gas companies inform the public about their 
environmental impact and the risks involved 
 
Oil and gas companies participate in activities which aim to 
protect and improve the quality of the natural environment 
 
Oil and gas companies implement special programs to 
minimize their negative impact on the natural environment 
20. General Image 
The general impression I have of oil and gas companies is…  




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































One-sided pro CCS condition 
  
CO2 Capture and Storage has Positive Consequences for Climate 
 
In the Netherlands, a lot of energy is used. This energy is mainly produced by fossil 
fuels such as oil, natural gas, and coal. During the production of energy from fossil 
fuels carbon dioxide (CO2) is released. International agreements have been made to 
reduce CO2 emissions. Reduction of CO2 can be achieved in several ways. One of 
these ways is the implementation of CO2 capture and storage technology. The 
capture and deep underground storage of CO2 is also considered in the Netherlands. 
 
The increase of CO2 in the air can contribute to the rise of the average temperature 
on earth. Recent research shows that considerably less CO2 will be released into the 
air when CO2 capture and storage is implemented. This helps to combat global 
warming. Thus, CO2 capture and storage has benefits for the climate.  
 
 
One-sided con CCS condition  
 
CO2 Capture and Storage has Negative Consequences for Ground Water 
 
In the Netherlands, a lot of energy is used. This energy is mainly produced by fossil 
fuels such as oil, natural gas, and coal. During the production of energy from fossil 
fuels carbon dioxide (CO2) is released. International agreements have been made to 
reduce CO2 emissions. Reduction of CO2 can be achieved in several ways. One of 
these ways is the implementation of CO2 capture and storage technology. The 
capture and deep underground storage of CO2 is also considered in the Netherlands. 
 
Recent research shows that there is a possibility that stored CO2 leaks from the 
underground reservoirs. If this happens, this could have negative consequences such 
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Two-sided pro CCS condition 
 
CO2 Capture and Storage has Positive Consequences for Climate 
 
In the Netherlands, a lot of energy is used. This energy is mainly produced by fossil 
fuels such as oil, natural gas, and coal. During the production of energy from fossil 
fuels carbon dioxide (CO2) is released. International agreements have been made to 
reduce CO2 emissions. Reduction of CO2 can be achieved in several ways. One of 
these ways is the implementation of CO2 capture and storage technology. The 
capture and deep underground storage of CO2 is also considered in the Netherlands. 
 
Recent research shows that the implementation of CO2 capture and storage has 
advantages as well as disadvantages. The increase of CO2 in the air can contribute to 
the rise of the average temperature on earth. Considerably less CO2 will be released 
into the air when CO2 capture and storage is implemented. This helps to combat 
global warming. Thus, CO2 capture and storage has benefits for the climate. 
However, if stored CO2 leaks from the underground reservoirs, negative 
consequences could occur such as acidification of the ground water. 
 
Many people support the implementation of CO2 capture and storage because of the 
positive consequences for the climate. One of them remarked: “The quality of our 
ground water is important, but so is combating global warming. I am convinced that 
this technology helps to keep the climate on earth livable. Although CO2 capture and 
storage can have negative consequences, the advantages for the climate outweigh 
the disadvantages for the ground water.”  
 
 
Two-sided con CCS condition  
 
CO2 Capture and Storage has Negative Consequences for Ground Water 
 
In the Netherlands, a lot of energy is used. This energy is mainly produced by fossil 
fuels such as oil, natural gas, and coal. During the production of energy from fossil 
fuels carbon dioxide (CO2) is released. International agreements have been made to 
reduce CO2 emissions. Reduction of CO2 can be achieved in several ways. One of 
these ways is the implementation of CO2 capture and storage technology. The 
capture and deep underground storage of CO2 is also considered in the Netherlands. 
 
Recent research shows that the implementation of CO2 capture and storage has 
advantages as well as disadvantages. The increase of CO2 in the air can contribute to 
the rise of the average temperature on earth. Considerably less CO2 will be released 
into the air when CO2 capture and storage is implemented. This helps to combat 
global warming. Thus, CO2 capture and storage has benefits for the climate. 
However, if stored CO2 leaks from the underground reservoirs, negative 
consequences could occur such as acidification of the ground water. 
 
Many people oppose the implementation of CO2 capture and storage because of the 
negative consequences for the climate. One of them remarked: “Combating global 
warming is important, but so is the quality of our ground water. We cannot allow 
that CO2 is being dumped underground. Although CO2 capture and storage also has 
positive consequences, the possible disadvantages for the ground water outweigh 
the advantages for the climate.”  
 
  




CO2 Capture and Storage 
 
In the Netherlands, a lot of energy is used. This energy is mainly produced by fossil 
fuels such as oil, natural gas, and coal. During the production of energy from fossil 
fuels carbon dioxide (CO2) is released. International agreements have been made to 
reduce CO2 emissions. Reduction of CO2 can be achieved in several ways. One of 
these ways is the implementation of CO2 capture and storage technology. The 
capture and deep underground storage of CO2 is also considered in the Netherlands. 
 
Recent research shows that the implementation of CO2 capture and storage has 
advantages as well as disadvantages. The increase of CO2 in the air can contribute to 
the rise of the average temperature on earth. Considerably less CO2 will be released 
into the air when CO2 capture and storage is implemented. This helps to combat 
global warming. Thus, CO2 capture and storage has benefits for the climate. 
However, if stored CO2 leaks from the underground reservoirs, negative 
consequences could occur such as acidification of the ground water. 
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Samenvatting (summary in Dutch) 
Valkuilen in de communicatie over CO2 -afvang en -opslag 
 
 
Dit proefschrift heeft als titel “Valkuilen in de communicatie over CO2 -afvang en -
opslag”. De technologie van het afvangen en opslaan van CO2 wordt in het kort ook 
wel “CCS” genoemd, naar het Engelse carbon dioxide capture and storage. CCS is een 
technologie waarmee CO2 wordt afgevangen dat vrijkomt bij de verbranding van 
fossiele brandstoffen (olie, gas en kolen) tijdens industriële processen, waarna de 
afgevangen CO2 in gesteenten diep onder de grond of zee opgeslagen wordt. CCS is 
één van de maatregelen die genomen kunnen worden om de groeiende hoeveelheid 
CO2 in de atmosfeer te verminderen. Het reduceren van CO2 is nodig omdat dit 
broeikasgas volgens het laatste rapport van de Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change een zeer belangrijke oorzaak van klimaatverandering is (IPCC, 2013). CCS is een 
controversiële technologie. Dat wil zeggen, er zijn voorstanders en tegenstanders die 
beiden de publieke opinie proberen te beïnvloeden. Het belang van de mening van het 
publiek voor een succesvolle introductie van CCS is gebleken uit het feit dat in 2010 
een demonstratieproject in Barendrecht werd afgeblazen vanwege een tekort aan 
publiek draagvlak (Brunsting et al., 2011).  
 
De publieke opinie over controversiële onderwerpen zoals CCS wordt onder andere 
beïnvloed door hoe er over deze onderwerpen wordt gecommuniceerd. Zo is 
bijvoorbeeld gebleken dat mensen anders over kernenergie gaan denken als deze 
vorm van energie wordt gerelateerd aan het tegengaan van klimaatverandering (Jones 
et al., 2012). Ook is de link gelegd tussen de wijze van communiceren over het CCS 
demonstratieproject in Barendrecht en het tekort aan draagvlak voor dit project 
(Brunsting et al., 2011). Vaak is communicatie over dergelijke onderwerpen persuasief 
van aard. Met persuasieve communicatie probeert een zender de gedachten, 
meningen of gedragingen van een ontvanger te beïnvloeden (e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1975; Gass & Seiter, 2007; Hovland et al., 1953). Hoe de aspecten van bron (i.e., 
zender), boodschap, onderwerp en ontvanger de impact van persuasieve 
communicatie bepalen, wordt uitgelegd door zogenaamde duale 
informatieverwerkingsmodellen (dual process models) zoals het heuristic-systematic 
model (HSM; Chaiken, 1980) en het elaboration likelihood model (ELM; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986). Duale informatieverwerkingsmodellen suggereren het bestaan van 
een continuüm met twee uiterste routes voor informatieverwerking: een 
systematische (of centrale) route en een heuristische (of perifere) route. Als mensen 
informatie systematisch verwerken, nemen ze alles wat er gezegd of geschreven wordt 
nauwkeurig onder de loep en komen dan tot een mening. Deze mensen worden dus 
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voornamelijk overtuigd door kenmerken van de boodschap. In tegendeel, als mensen 
informatie heuristisch verwerken, worden ze voornamelijk door zaken overtuigd die 
meer oppervlakkig dan inhoudelijk zijn, zoals kenmerken van de bron. Mensen 
verwerken informatie vooral via de heuristische route als ze niet heel erg gemotiveerd 
of betrokken zijn bij het onderwerp of als ze niet in staat zijn om de informatie dieper 
te verwerken (bijvoorbeeld door tijdgebrek of gebrek aan cognitieve capaciteit) 
(Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Echter, in het algemeen gebruiken mensen 
een combinatie van de twee verwerkingsroutes (Petty et al., 2005).  
 
Wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar informatieverwerking en persuasieve communicatie 
richt zich vooral op effectiviteit. Dat wil zeggen, er wordt onderzocht in hoeverre 
gedachten, meningen en gedragingen van mensen beïnvloed worden door 
communicatie. Zo is er bijvoorbeeld gevonden dat een mening langer beklijft en 
resistenter is als informatie systematisch is verwerkt dan als het heuristisch is verwerkt 
(Petty et al., 1995). Echter, tot nu toe ging er weinig (wetenschappelijke) aandacht uit 
naar wat mensen vinden van persuasieve communicatietechnieken en hoe deze 
waarnemingen van invloed zijn op evaluaties over de boodschap en de bron. Omdat 
deze effecten relatief verwaarloosd zijn, kan een bepaalde techniek op de korte 
termijn effectief lijken, terwijl dit op de lange termijn niet het geval hoeft te zijn.    
Bijvoorbeeld, op de korte termijn kan het delen van louter positieve informatie over 
een product—terwijl negatieve informatie wordt stilgehouden—zorgen voor een 
positieve houding tegenover het product, en wellicht gunstige verkoopcijfers. Echter, 
het zou zo kunnen zijn dat mensen het niet eerlijk vinden als negatieve informatie 
achter wordt houden. Dergelijke negatieve evaluaties kunnen de effectiviteit van 
communicatie verminderen en op de lange termijn tot imagoschade en winstverlies 
leiden (e.g., Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Campbell, 1995; Polonsky, 1995; Polonsky & 
Rosenberger III, 2001; Terwel et al., 2009a). Dit noem ik de valkuil van (persuasieve) 
communicatie.  
 
Het experimentele en survey onderzoek dat ik in dit proefschrift presenteer was 
gericht op de identificatie van potentiele valkuilen in de communicatie over CCS. In 
mijn onderzoek heb ik de focus gelegd op communicatie van olie- en 
gasmaatschappijen, omdat deze organisaties in het verleden de persuasieve 
communicatietechnieken hebben toegepast die ik wilde onderzoeken (Brunsting et al., 
2011). Ik heb de communicatie van olie- en gasmaatschappijen vergeleken met die van 
andere partijen die communiceren over CCS, zoals milieuorganisaties en persbureaus, 
om te testen in hoeverre de effectiviteit en potentiële valkuilen van communicatie 
afhangen van een bepaald soort bron. Ik heb drie persuasieve 
communicatietechnieken onderzocht aan de hand van drie onderzoekslijnen. In 
Hoofdstuk 1 van dit proefschrift verbind ik deze lijnen met elkaar en beschrijf hun 
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verschillen en overeenkomsten. Ook beschrijf ik de context waarin het onderzoek is 
uitgevoerd en in hoeverre het huidige onderzoek gegeneraliseerd kan worden naar 
andere onderwerpen en vormen van communicatie.  
 
In Hoofdstuk 2 laat ik de valkuil zien van het opstapelen van veel verschillende stukjes 
informatie in één tekst. Olie- en gasmaatschappijen kunnen informatie over CCS 
stapelen in de hoop dat één of meer van die stukjes informatie mensen zal overtuigen 
om de implementatie van de technologie te steunen. Ze zouden bovendien informatie 
kunnen opstapelen omdat mensen een lange tekst vaak overtuigend vinden (de 
length-implies-strength heuristiek; e.g., Stec & Bernstein, 1999). Echter, ik vond dat het 
opstapelen van informatie averechts kan werken. Namelijk, als er irrelevante details 
over CCS (bijvoorbeeld dat er informatie over CCS op internet staat) aan een relevante 
boodschap worden toegevoegd, neemt de overtuigingskracht van de relevante 
boodschap af. Dit wordt het verdunningseffect, of dilution effect, genoemd (e.g., 
Meyvis & Janiszewski, 2002; Nisbett et al., 1981). De overtuigingskracht van zowel een 
positieve boodschap over CCS (de technologie helpt klimaatverandering tegen te gaan) 
als een negatieve boodschap (omdat het een nieuwe technologie betreft kan veiligheid 
niet volledig worden gegarandeerd) kan worden verdund, hoewel het effect sterker is 
bij een positieve boodschap. Het proces dat ten grondslag ligt aan het 
verdunningseffect is dat aangelengde informatie kwalitatief zwakker wordt gevonden 
dan niet-aangelengde informatie. Ik heb verder nog bekeken of irrelevante details de 
aandacht afleiden van de hoofdboodschap, maar dat bleek niet het geval. Informatie 
die dezelfde valentie heeft als de hoofdboodschap (positief of negatief), maar minder 
relevant is, heeft geen verdunnend effect. Echter, deze minder relevante informatie 
versterkt de hoofdboodschap ook niet, dus is er weinig reden om minder relevante 
informatie toe te voegen. Er is ook een manier om het verdunningseffect te bestrijden. 
Het effect treedt namelijk niet op als de ontvanger een goed beeld heeft wie er achter 
de communicatie zit, doordat bijvoorbeeld een logo van het bedrijf zichtbaar is of de 
naam van de bron duidelijk vermeld is. Dit komt doordat mensen (via de heuristische 
verwerkingsroute) de broninformatie gebruiken om de informatie te beoordelen in 
plaats van dat ze zich baseren op de inhoud van de communicatie.  
 
In Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijf ik de valkuilen van het benadrukken van voordelen of nadelen 
van CCS in communicatie (emphasis-framing). Olie- en gasmaatschappijen kunnen 
geneigd zijn om de voordelen van CCS te benadrukken, omdat nadruk in communicatie 
de mening van mensen kan beïnvloeden (Druckman & Bolsen, 2011). Ik heb inderdaad 
gevonden dat mensen positiever over CCS gaan denken als de voordelen van de 
technologie voor het klimaat worden benadrukt, vergeleken met als de eventuele 
risico’s worden benadrukt. Echter, ik vond tegelijkertijd dat mensen het kleuren van 
communicatie manipulatief vinden en zelfs onacceptabel wanneer zij gebalanceerde, 
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informatieve communicatie verwachten. Dit is bijvoorbeeld het geval als een instantie 
die geacht wordt objectief te zijn, zoals een persbureau, communicatie kleurt. Dit is 
een belangrijke keerzijde van emphasis-framing, omdat deze percepties van 
manipulatie op de lange termijn kunnen leiden tot negatieve bronevaluaties en afkeer 
van de boodschap (e.g., Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Campbell, 1995; Terwel et al., 2009a). 
Als een commercieel bedrijf, zoals een olie- en gasmaatschappij, communicatie kleurt 
wordt dit ook zeer manipulatief gevonden. Echter, mensen vinden een gekleurde 
boodschap van deze bron niet minder acceptabel dan een gebalanceerde boodschap, 
omdat zij gekleurde communicatie van dergelijke bedrijven verwachten.  
 
Bovenstaande resultaten doen vermoeden dat olie- en gasmaatschappijen bepaalde 
valkuilen in de communicatie over CCS kunnen vermijden. Ik heb per slot van rekening 
aangetoond dat deze organisaties het verdunningseffect van irrelevante details 
kunnen ontwijken door hun identiteit duidelijk kenbaar te maken en dat het kleuren 
van een boodschap vooral onacceptabel is voor bronnen die verwacht worden 
objectief te zijn. Echter, dit vermoeden is niet geheel terecht. Olie- en 
gasmaatschappijen hebben namelijk te kampen met een negatief imago (Yoon et al., 
2006). Dit blijkt ook uit een survey die ik gehouden heb onder een representatieve 
groep volwassen Nederlanders (Appendix A). Het voornaamste doel van deze survey 
(waar ik door middel van voetnoten naar refereer in dit proefschrift) was inzicht te 
verkrijgen in publieke percepties van olie- en gasmaatschappijen in relatie tot CCS, 
maar ik heb onder andere ook het algemene imago gemeten van deze organisaties. 
Zodra olie- en gasmaatschappijen hun identiteit blootgeven kan dit negatieve 
algemene imago worden geactiveerd, hetgeen er onder andere voor kan zorgen dat 
bepaalde communicatietechnieken minder effectief worden (Druckman, 2001).  
 
Ook kan het negatieve imago van olie- en gasmaatschappijen bijdragen aan 
ongewenste bronevaluaties. Dit laat Hoofdstuk 4 zien waarin ik kijk naar de valkuilen 
van het “vergroenen” van bedrijfsactiviteiten. Commerciële organisaties kunnen 
geneigd zijn hun bedrijfsactiviteiten als milieuvriendelijk te presenteren, omdat 
positieve informatie over de maatschappelijke verantwoordelijkheid van een bedrijf bij 
kan dragen tot een positief algemeen imago (Alniacik, Alniacik, & Genc, 2011; Sen & 
Bhattacharya, 2001). Het huidige onderzoek toont echter aan dat het geven van een 
groen motief voor de investering in CCS niet leidt tot dit gewenste effect. Ik heb 
gevonden dat olie- en gasmaatschappijen die investeren in CCS a priori—zonder dat zij 
iets communiceren—beschuldigd worden van groenwassen: het valselijk presenteren 
van bedrijfsactiviteiten als “groen” om milieuvriendelijker te lijken dan je eigenlijk bent 
(greenwashing; e.g., Laufer, 2003; Vos, 2009). Verdenkingen van groenwassen worden 
in verband gebracht met ongewenste effecten op de lange termijn, zoals protest, 
boycot en financiële verliezen voor het bedrijf (e.g., Polonsky, 1995; Polonsky & 
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Rosenberger III, 2001). De reden dat bedrijven die investeren in CCS a priori worden 
verdacht van groenwassen kan zijn dat mensen het hypocriet vinden als organisaties 
die door hun activiteiten het milieu belasten een technologie ontwikkelen die 
klimaatverandering helpt tegen te gaan (Yoon et al., 2006). Het huidige onderzoek laat 
zien dat olie- en gasmaatschappijen deze a priori verdenking van groenwassen niet 
weg kunnen nemen door te communiceren dat ze investeren in CCS vanwege het feit 
dat CCS voordelen heeft voor het klimaat, zelfs niet als ze ontkennen dat het eigenlijke 
motief om te investeren economisch zou zijn (om eventuele twijfels over hun 
motieven weg te nemen). De verdenking van groenwassen neemt alleen af als een 
bedrijf juist toegeeft vanuit een winstoogmerk in CCS te investeren, met of zonder 
ontkenning van een groen motief. Het psychologische proces dat hieraan ten 
grondslag ligt is dat olie- en gasbedrijven die een groen motief geven ervan verdacht 
worden een strategisch doel na te streven, zoals het zoeken naar publiciteit en het 
verwerven van nieuwe klanten. Dit leidt tot de beschuldiging van groenwassen. Olie- 
en gasbedrijven die een economisch motief geven worden in mindere mate van 
strategisch gedrag verdacht—het motief wordt eerlijk gevonden—en daardoor worden 
ze ook in mindere mate van groenwassen beschuldigd. Het huidige onderzoek toont 
overigens aan dat bovenstaand proces vooral geldt voor mensen die van nature niet 
zeer sceptisch tegenover bedrijfscommunicatie staan. Mensen die wel van nature 
sceptisch zijn zullen waarschijnlijk altijd aan de oprechtheid van bedrijven twijfelen, 
ongeacht de gecommuniceerde boodschap.  
 
Samenvattend toont dit proefschrift aan dat het communiceren over CCS valkuilen 
kent. Het opstapelen van informatie kan ertoe leiden dat de meest relevante 
boodschap niet overkomt (Hoofdstuk 2), het benadrukken van voordelen of nadelen 
wordt manipulatief gevonden, en zelfs als onacceptabel gezien als objectieve 
informatie wordt verwacht (Hoofdstuk 3), en in plaats dat mensen een industriële 
organisatie die communiceert in CCS te investeren vanwege het milieu 
milieuvriendelijk vinden, ziet men dit als een uiting van strategisch gedrag (Hoofdstuk 
4). De identificatie van deze valkuilen heeft duidelijke implicaties voor organisaties met 
een belang in CCS. Echter, het heeft ook implicaties voor wetenschappers die de 
effecten van persuasieve communicatie onderzoeken en voor het algemene publiek 
dat geconfronteerd wordt met deze vorm van communicatie. Dit onderzoek geeft 
organisaties die betrokken zijn bij CCS het inzicht dat zij, als zij zowel effectief willen 
communiceren als positief beoordeeld willen worden op de lange termijn, in hun 
communicatie rekening moeten houden met de verwachtingen van het publiek en het 
beste een relevante, gebalanceerde en geloofwaardige boodschap kunnen delen. 
Onderzoekers kunnen van de huidige resultaten leren dat ze in toekomstig onderzoek 
niet alleen naar de effectiviteit van persuasieve communicatietechnieken kunnen 
kijken, maar ook naar hoe deze technieken ontvangen worden door het publiek. Tot 
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slot kan het algemene publiek wellicht tot een beter geïnformeerde mening komen 
over moeilijke onderwerpen—zoals CCS—als ze communicatie op een meer kritische 
manier benaderen. Dit proefschrift kan mensen vooral aanzetten om kritisch te kijken 
naar persuasieve technieken, hetgeen hen kan helpen om beïnvloeding te weerstaan 
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